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TRUST REPAIR AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCIAL COMPENSATIONS
Trust is a valuable resource that facilitates and smoothes interactions in all kinds of
rela tions that we engage in. Whether we ask a stranger for directions or advice from a
close friend, we would often not get far if we did not trust others. In economic exchange
relations too, where agents exchange resources that have a tangible economic value, trust
has proven to be particularly useful as it fosters cooperation while at the same time
reducing the need for expenditures on control and monitoring. Questions like “What are
the benefits of trust?” and “How can trust be built effectively?” have already found their
answer in the literature. However, on how to deal with lowered trust after it was violated,
answers still tend to be empirically unclear.
Given that transgressions in economic relations often result in distributive harm for the
victim (i.e. loss of economic resources), a common approach in exchange relations consists
of the transgressor providing a financial compensation to the victim: if a customer has
complaints about a product, he is reimbursed; when a company is being sued, it often tries
to make a financial settlement with the victims. Strangely enough, the high prevalence of
financial compensations as a restorative response contrasts sharply with how little is known
about their effectiveness. Can financial compensations actually increase trust again and
what are the factors that determine their effectiveness? 
This dissertation aims to provide some first, much needed empirical answers regarding
the effectiveness of financial compensations in restoring trust. In this venture, I will not
only show how aspects of the compensation itself determine effectiveness (size,
voluntariness, whether or not an apology is provided in addition), but also how specific
characteristics of the violation, the victim and the transgressor impact victims’ reactions to
a compensation.
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"There's a huge trust. I see it all the time when people come up to me and say, 'I don't want 
you to let me down again.' " 
 
George W. Bush—Boston, Oct. 3, 2000 
 
 
 
 
“Cash rules everything around me, 
C.R.E.A.M. 
Get the money, dollar, dollar bill yall.” 
 
Wu-Tang Clan 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of trust is inescapable when we interact with others in our social 
world. Whether we ask directions from a stranger or advice from a close friend, in 
many of our daily interactions we have to trust others in order to get somewhere. 
Given that the outcome of an interaction is often uncertain and depends on the 
actions of others, we frequently have to rely on trusting others, whether we like it 
or not. In such situations, having trust not only stimulates us to overcome this 
uncertainty and to engage in interactions with others, but it also fuels us to be 
more benevolent and cooperative towards our interaction partners, which in turn 
makes it also more likely that they will honor our trust and be cooperative as well. 
As such, trust serves as a social glue that facilitates interactions in all kinds of 
relations that individuals engage in. 
Given the pervasiveness of trust in our daily lives, it comes as no surprise 
that scholars have put the topic of trust on research agendas in a variety of 
domains, including psychology, sociology, law and economics (Putnam, 1993; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Hardin, 2002; Gambetta, 1988; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Tyler & 
Huo, 2002). In these fields, a shared understanding exists that trust is an important 
force that shapes and smoothens our interactional life. Across these disciplines, 
researchers have advocated trust as having numerous benefits to individuals, 
organizations or society as a whole (Kramer & Cook, 2004).  
Psychologists, for example, have not only linked trust to love and 
happiness in close relationships (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), but also 
observed that in all kinds of relations trust functions as an important precursor of 
cooperation, which generates mutual benefits to interacting parties (Brann & 
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Foddy 1987; De Cremer, Snyder, & De Witte, 2001). For similar reasons, 
organizational scholars and economists have identified trust as a trademark of 
effective organizations, as it fosters cooperation while reducing the need for 
expenditures on control and monitoring (Bromiley & Cummings, 1996; Chiles & 
McMackin, 1996), increases performance (Dirks, 2000; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001, 
2002) and enables effective negotiation (Kimmel et al. 1980; Valley, Moag, & 
Bazerman, 1998). Sociologists on the other hand, have pointed to the benefits of 
trust on a societal level. Trust according to them is a key component of social 
capital, which in turn is a necessary ingredient for social integration, economic 
efficiency and democratic stability (Coleman 1998; Gambetta, 1988; Fukuyama, 
1995; Putnam, 1993; Newton, 2001).  
Given the widespread benefits of trust, an important mission for 
researchers was to uncover the factors that underlie the presence or development 
of trust. Researchers therefore devoted considerable attention to studying the 
antecedents of trust. In this venture, scholars have for example shown that the 
level of trust that an individual has, can depend on the individual itself in the sense 
that individuals generally differ in their dispositional tendency to trust others 
(Rotter, 1967; 1971; Yamagishi, 1988). However, apart from these individual 
differences, research has also identified several situational factors that influence 
the degree of trust (see e.g. Kramer, 1999, for a review). Trust is for example also 
influenced by the prior interaction history with the interaction partner (Boon & 
Holmes, 1991; McAllister, 1995; Deutsch 1958), the social category that an 
interaction partner belongs to (Brewer, 1981) or the social role that an interaction 
partner occupies (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). 
Despite the importance of trust in our daily lives, it took a long time 
before a consensus emerged on an overarching definition of trust. In fact, the 
broad interest by scholars from different disciplines generated a myriad of 
definitions, in which trust took different forms depending on the field it was 
Chapter 1 
 
                                                                                                                 
 3 
studied in. In the behavioral tradition, for example, sociologists and economists 
have often viewed trust as a rational decision to cooperate, based on confidence 
and expectations (Gambetta, 1988; Arrow, 1974). Under the influence of the 
psychological tradition, however, who argued that trust is not necessarily a 
condition for cooperation to occur (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), trust is 
now more and more being viewed as a psychological state that includes 
expectations, intentions and affect (Kramer, 1999; Lewicki, Tomlinson, & 
Gillespie, 2006). One of the most widely held definitions today therefore 
characterizes trust a “psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of 
another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395).  
 
1.1 TRUST IN ECONOMIC EXCHANGE RELATIONS  
 
One type of relations in which trust has been shown to play a vital role is 
economic exchange relations, relations in which actors exchange tangible, 
economic resources. These relations are typically characterized by a high degree 
of interdependence as actors depend on each other with regard to the outcomes 
they receive. This dependence on another’s actions can however make actors 
uncertain whether they will receive the desired outcomes and induce a strong fear 
of exploitation. Given that trust is considered to be particularly important when 
interactions involve risk-taking and actors are interdependent, the interdependence 
in exchange relations and the associated risk with being vulnerable to the actions 
of others therefore already highlight the importance of trust to initiate and preserve 
cooperative interactions (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998; Boon 
& Holmes, 1991).  
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For a long time, however, the literature on economic exchange was 
dominated by a vision in which trust was considered as unnecessary or irrelevant 
to preserve cooperation, as the uncertainty and risk associated with the outcome 
dependencies could also be reduced by other mechanisms that enable cooperation, 
such as contracts or control mechanisms that reward cooperation and sanction 
defection (see e.g., Williamson, 1993). Research has now proven that such 
instruments actually are only a weak substitute for trust, as contracts are often 
incomplete and control mechanisms are seldomly flawless (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; 
Sako & Helper, 1998). Moreover, these mechanisms are often not as effective as 
hoped for, because they undermine cooperation that is voluntary (Fehr & Gächter, 
2002) and decrease performance (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). Furthermore, contracts 
and control mechanisms are more expensive and increase transaction costs (Dyer 
& Chu, 2003; Bromiley & Cummings, 1996). Therefore scholars nowadays agree 
that trust is both beneficial and necessary in exchange relations, as it is a cheap 
and more effective way to create long-term cooperation (Kramer, 1999; Lorenz, 
1999; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995).  
Given the advantages of trust in exchange relations, scholars have devoted 
considerable attention to studying what drives trust between actors in these 
particular relations. Although there is common ground on a definition of trust 
these days, it is important to note that researchers also agree that trust can take 
different forms and is shaped by different concerns depending on the type of 
relation it functions in (Rousseau et al., 1998; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998; 
Lewicki, Wiethoff, & Tomlinson, 2005). According to some influential models, 
economic exchange relations are typically characterized by a more cognitive, 
calculus-based trust as opposed to a more relational, identification-based trust 
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996; Lewicki et al., 2005; Rousseau et al., 1998; see 
also the difference between cognition- and  affect-based trust, McAllister, 1995).  
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Whereas identification-based trust refers to a trust that is rooted in an 
accrued understanding and appreciation of the other’s values, motives and desires, 
calculus-based trust is a more market-oriented calculation where people decide to 
trust based on the expectancy of receiving a specific, tangible benefit (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1996; Lewicki et al., 2005). The focus of calculus-based trust is therefore 
more on the transaction (exchange) itself and trust is built through a consistent 
delivery of the valued outcomes that one expects. Calculus-based trust is thus 
particularly driven by instrumental, outcome-related concerns and the 
trustworthiness of an interaction partner is derived from the favorability of the 
outcome of a transaction with this person.  In relations that have developed 
identification-based trust, however, the focus is more on the relation itself as 
actors have developed emotional attachment and trust is more driven by affect and 
interpersonal concern than just by the outcomes of a transaction (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998; McAllister, 1995).  
Given that in economic exchange relations interactions mainly consist of 
resource allocations between agents, scholars have argued that when actors enter 
in an economic exchange relation, trust is typically more calculus-based than 
identification-based (Rousseau et al., 1998; Lewicki et al., 2005). Over time, 
however, repeated interactions in which trust is reciprocated can cause trust to 
solidify, attachment to rise and the relation itself to become the basis of trust. For 
the nascence of this stronger, identification-based trust then, it is imperative that 
actors can reliably depend on the interaction partner to satisfy their instrumental 
concerns by consistently providing the desired transaction outcome.  
Despite this importance of repeated reciprocation for calculus-based trust 
to develop, we can see that actors in exchange relations from time to time defect 
and engage in behaviour that violates their interaction partner’s expectations, 
risking trust to erode and cooperation to disappear. Can trust be repaired in such 
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situations? Are there actions that can be undertaken to increase trust again and 
what factors determine their effectiveness? These are some of the key questions 
that will be covered in this dissertation. 
 
1.2 VIOLATIONS OF TRUST AND TRUST REPAIR 
 
If we look at the literature on trust in exchange relations, it becomes 
painstakingly clear that a strong emphasis on the presence and benefits of trust has 
long lead scholars to leave the issue of violated trust and, more importantly, the 
question whether trust can be repaired, in an empirical shade (De Cremer & 
Desmet, in press). Part of the reason for this is that the negative consequences of 
trust violations are detrimental: not only can trust violations result in an immediate 
decline of cooperation, they can also incite victims to actively seek revenge (Bies 
& Tripp, 1996) or poison the relation with suspicion and distrust, which has 
adverse effects for the relation in the long run (Elangovan, Auer-Rizzi, & Szabo, 
2007). Trust therefore seems easier to destroy than to build and accordingly, the 
divide between the relative ease of losing someone's trust compared to gaining it 
has led scholars to devote little attention to the issue of trust repair, as repairing 
trust might be even more difficult than establishing trust in the first place. (Kim, 
Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006).  
Over the last few years, however, researchers have slowly begun to 
investigate the workings of trust repair. In this venture, scholars have mainly 
studied the effectiveness of verbal repair efforts by the offender, such as apologies, 
excuses, or promises (e.g., Kim et al., 2004; 2006; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 
2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006; De Cremer & Desmet, in press). 
These studies for example showed that offering a sincere apology or an explicit 
promise of future trustworthy behavior may sometimes indeed yield positive 
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effects on trust (Tomlinson et al., 2004; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; Kim 
et al., 2004; 2006; Schweitzer et al., 2006).  
As mentioned before, in economic exchange relations, interactions are 
characterized by the allocation of tangible outcomes. As a result, a trust violation 
in these relations often results in distributive harm for the victim (i.e. an actor does 
not provide the resources the victim was hoping to get). Given that trust in these 
relations is typically more calculus-based and actors are particularly sensitive to 
the outcome of a transaction, receiving an apology or a promise of future 
cooperative behavior from the transgressor might be regarded by victims as “cheap 
talk” and therefore not the most effective way to restore trust following 
distributive harm (Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002).  
Indeed, as trust can have a more transactional or relational basis 
depending on the relationship between the actors, violations of these different 
types of trust might also call for different restorative strategies (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1996; Lewicki et al., 2005). Whereas sincere and elaborate apologies 
might be efficient in addressing the thwarted relational concerns of identification 
based-trust, in economic exchange relations, where trust is more calculus-based 
and shaped the outcome of the transaction, addressing relational concerns alone by 
apologizing might not be enough. More precisely, when trust is violated in 
economic exchange relations and victims are denied the valuable resources that 
they expected, the process of trust repair in these relations may first of all require 
efforts that address victims’ outcome-related concerns. Actions may therefore 
speak louder than words and transgressors may need to address the distributive 
harm first by providing a financial compensation to the victim. 
Looking at daily life conflicts in which trust has been violated through 
distributive harm, we can indeed see that a common approach in exchange 
relations consists of the transgressor providing a financial compensation to the 
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victim: customers with complaints about a product are often reimbursed; 
companies that are being sued, often try to make a financial settlement with the 
victim. Despite this widespread use of financial compensation as restorative 
response to distributive harm, little is known about how these financial 
compensations impact victims’ trust towards the transgressor. Can financial 
compensations actually increase trust following distributive harm? What factors 
influence their effectiveness? These are the central questions that I wil try to 
answer throughout this dissertation 
 
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT DISSERTATION 
 
Whereas the provision of a financial compensation is a common strategy 
in response to distributive harm, not much is known about how these 
compensations affect victims’ trust.  In the present dissertation I will provide an 
overview of four streams of research that I conducted to shed more light on this 
issue.  
Starting with the basic question whether financial compensations increase 
trust, we move onwards to examine the factors that determine the effectiveness of 
providing a financial compensation. Given the importance of outcomes for trust in 
economic exchange relations, is the size of a compensation important and do 
larger compensations foster more trust? Is it only outcome favorabililty that 
underlies the effect of financial compensations or are there other, immaterial 
aspects that also shape their effectiveness, such as whether a compensation was 
provided voluntarily or ordered by a third party?   
In the next four empirical chapters, I will explore several factors that 
influence the effect of a financial compensation on victims’ trust. In this venture, I 
will not only look at how aspects of the compensation itself affect trust, but also 
describe how specific characteristics of the violation, the victim, and the 
Chapter 1 
 
                                                                                                                 
 9 
transgressor interact in shaping victims’ reactions to a compensation. Furthermore, 
throughout these four chapters, the effectiveness of financial compensations will 
not only be evaluated in terms of the levels of self-reported trust they foster, but 
also in terms of the behavioural repercussions they entail. 
 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 aims to provide empirical answers to some basic first questions 
regarding the effectiveness of financial compensations: Can financial 
compensations increase trust again and is the size of the compensation relevant to 
this process? Is it enough for a transgressor to exactly repay for the damage or 
does the process of trust repair require more effort? In Chapter 2, I will argue that 
financial compensations can indeed increase trust towards a transgressor, but 
whether the size of the compensation is important depends on how trust was 
violated and more precisely, on the degree to which the violation could be 
attributed to bad intent. Throughout four experiments that were conducted to 
address these questions, I will show that providing a compensation that is larger 
than the harm done, can actually foster more trust than exactly restoring the harm, 
but not if the transgressor’s intention to transgress was clear. The experiments 
reported in Chapter 2 evaluate the effectiveness of financial compensatons in 
terms of the increase in victims’ self-reported trust they foster (Experiment 2.1, 
2.2), in terms of whether or not victims are inclined to continue the relationship 
(Experiment 2.3) and in terms of victims’ subsequent behaviour towards the 
transgressor in a trust game (Experiment 2.4). 
 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 2 shows that larger compensations can foster more trust, although 
this depends on how trust was violated (i.e. the extent to which bad intent becomes 
Trust Repair and the Psychology of Financial Compensations 
 
 10 
clear in the violation). Chapter 3 moves one step further and investigates whether 
the effect of compensation size also depends on how the compensation is provided. 
In the studies reported in Chapter 2, the decision to compensate was made by the 
transgressor on a voluntary basis. In the course of real-life violations, however, 
voluntary acts of repair appear to be an exception rather than a rule, as actors in 
exchange relations often let a third party decide whether and what reparation is 
appropriate (cf. tort litigation). Do victims care whether a compensation is 
provided voluntarily or not, or do they primarily value the size of the 
compensation when deciding to trust again? In contrast to outcome-based models 
of economic behavior which would predict that victims only care about the 
outcomes they receive and therefore would only consider the size of the 
compensation, in Chapter 3, I will argue that larger compensations will only foster 
more trust if they also reflect good intent on behalf of the transgressor (i.e. when 
they are provided voluntarily). Experiment 3.1 was designed to investigate the 
impact of this third-party intervention, using the paradigm of a trust game.  
 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 2 and 3 evaluate the effectiveness of financial compensations as a 
function of situational characteristics of the violation (clarity of intentions) or the 
compensation (size, voluntariness). In Chapter 4, I will take a broader perspective 
and also examine how personality characteristics of the victim influence the 
effectiveness of financial compensations. Given that the explicit focus of this 
dissertation lies on restoration processes, I deemed it would be an interesting first 
step to investigate how individual differences in people’s tendency to forgive 
impact how financial compensations are perceived, processed and reacted upon by 
victims. As forgiveness is typically viewed as something that is given and not 
necessarily earned, in Chapter 4, I hypothesize that people with a higher tendency 
to forgive will be less sensitive to whether a restoration attempt expresses the 
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transgressor’s repentance or not. Given that voluntary compensations are more 
likely to communicate offender’s repentance than compensations that were forced 
by a third party, Experiment 4.1 tested the meditational hypothesis that whereas 
receiving a voluntary compensation from the transgressor communicates more 
repentance to victims than when this compensation is imposed, particularly people 
with a low tendency to forgive will discount this repentance in their decision to 
trust again.  
 
Chapter 5 
Chapters 2-4 study the effectiveness of financial compensations when 
offered in isolation. In real life, however, a commonly heard claim is that victims 
often do not consider a financial compensation as enough and that sometimes they 
explicitly wish to receive a formal apology too. In Chapter 5, I will examine 
whether in the event of distributive harm in exchange relations, providing an 
apology in additition to a financial compensation fosters more trust than the sole 
provision of a compensation. As financial compensations particularly address 
outcome related concerns and apologies more explicitly speak to relational 
concerns, I will argue that the addition of an apology will be more effective in 
situations in which relational concerns are also salient. More specifically, in 
Chapter 5, I hypothesize that adding an apology to a compensation can indeed 
result in more trust, but particularly so when victims are interacting with a group 
rather than with an individual. In Experiment 5.1 and 5.2, I tested this hypothesis 
within the context of a trust game, incorporating both behavioural and self-
reported measures of trust, as well using both basic and and elaborate apologies. 
 
Chapter 6 
In Chapter 6, I will summarize and integrate the main empirical 
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observations that were gathered in the course of this dissertation. In doing so, I 
will discuss the most important implications and contributions of our findings, as 
well as pinpoint possible limitations and explore worthwhile avenues for future 
research.  
Finally, I would like to note that Chapters 2 to 5 are all based on papers 
that have been published or submitted for publication. As a result, each of these 
chapters can be read separately of the other chapters, but this also implies that the 
reader may encounter some overlap between parts of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. HOW THE TYPE OF VIOLATION AFFECTS THE IMPACT OF 
COMPENSATION SIZE: THE ROLE OF INTENT AMBIGUITY1 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In exchange relations in which monetary resources have to be divided 
between two parties, such as in bargaining games, people prefer allocations to be 
divided in an equal way (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Pillutla & Murnighan, 2003; 
Handgraaf, Van Dijk, & De Cremer, 2003; Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 
2004). Consequently, a violation of the equality rule in these mixed-motive 
situations is generally perceived as unfair and invites a host of negative reactions 
(Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2006). One of the 
most important consequences of such violations is that trust in the allocating party 
decreases (Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002; De Cremer, Van Dijk, & 
Pillutla, 2010; Schweitzer et al., 2006). Trust has been defined as “a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Based on this definition, a violation of positive 
expectations -such as expecting an equal share- should have a negative impact on 
trust.  
Given the fact that many instances exist where people’s positive 
expectations towards the actions of others are violated (e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 
1996; Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; Bottom et al., 2002; Kim et. al., 2004; 
Tomlinson et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006; Schweitzer et al., 2006), it is surprising 
to see that to date hardly any research has examined the extent to which trust can 
                                                           
1 This chapter is based on Desmet, De Cremer & Van Dijk (2011a) 
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be restored again, particularly when equality expectations are violated. Even more 
so, in the psychology literature in general, the issue of how violated trust can be 
effectively restored has not received much theoretical and empirical attention yet 
(Kim et al., 2006; Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009). 
Acknowledging the numerous negative consequences of lowered trust (see 
e.g. Jones & George, 1998; Kramer, 1999), it seems more than ever necessary to 
understand how and when specific restoration tools may be effective in promoting 
trust again. In exchange relations, when distributive harm emerges, a common 
restorative approach is for transgressors to restore the monetary loss by providing 
a financial compensation to the victim. As trust in economic exchange relations 
has been argued to be driven particularly by a concern for tangible outcomes, 
financial compensations should then indeed be able to facilitate the process of 
restoring trust (cf. Lewicki et al., 2005). Moreover, such a calculative view on 
trust also implies that larger compensations should foster more trust. 
Unfortunately, however, research to date (at least to our knowledge) has not yet 
addressed the specific question to what degree providing financial compensations 
in response to distributive harm can actually increase trust in the transgressing 
party and whether the size of the compensation is relevant in this process. 
In an effort to address this question, we present results from four 
experimental studies that examined how and when financial compensations may 
help in restoring people’s trust after trust was initially violated by an unfair 
allocation of outcomes. In this exchange context, we investigated whether 
financial overcompensations (i.e. the victim of the trust violation ends up with 
higher final financial outcomes) may be more effective than exact compensations 
(i.e. both the transgressor and the victim of the trust violation end up with equal 
final outcomes). Furthermore, in line with the idea that the effect of financial 
compensations may depend on whether the transgression was intentional or not, 
(Darley & Pittman, 2003), we develop the argument that the impact of the size of a 
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financial compensation on trust repair will depend on whether the initial trust 
violation could be attributed to bad intent or not.  
 
2.1.1 Repairing trust with financial compensations  
 
In the event of distributive harm, a widespread response in economic 
exchange relations consists of providing a financial compensation to the victim: If 
a customer has complaints about a product, he is reimbursed; when a company is 
being sued, it often tries to make a financial settlement with the victims. To 
examine the impact of compensations on a victim’s trust towards the transgressor, 
and to assess what factors influence its effectiveness, it is first of all useful to 
zoom in on what has been argued to drive trust in these types of exchange 
relations.  
Apart from a broad consensus on an overarching definition of trust, 
scholars also appear to agree that trust can take different forms and is shaped by 
different concerns depending on the type of exchange relation one is involved in 
(Rouseau et al., 1998; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 
1998). One of the most widely used theoretical models, for example, depicts trust 
in economic exchange relations as more calculus-based as opposed to 
identification-based (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; 1996; Lewicki et al., 2005).  
Whereas identification-based trust in this context is seen as trust driven by an 
identification with the other’s desires and motives, calculus-based trust is a more 
market-oriented, economic calculation: actors decide to trust based on the 
expectancy of receiving a specific, tangible benefit (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; 
Lewicki et al., 2005). As such, in economic exchange relations - where 
interactions occur mainly trough the giving and receiving of economic resources - 
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particularly outcome related concerns should determine one’s trust and 
trustworthiness. 
Given this proposed preoccupation with outcomes in exchange relations, 
scholars have argued that receiving a financial compensation in response to 
distributive harm should be an effective tool in restoring a victim’s trust (Lewicki 
et al., 2005; Ren & Gray, 2009). Recent findings by Bottom et al. (2002), in the 
context of a multiple round prisoner’s dilemma, provided empirical support for 
this claim by showing that cooperation, after a party had breached it, was 
effectively rebuilt when the transgressor offered a substantial financial 
compensation. However, an interesting question that arises is to what extent the 
size of this compensation matters to victims of a trust violation.  
In their study, Bottom et al. (2002) also manipulated the size of the 
financial compensation and observed that this manipulation had no influence: 
small compensations were as effective as larger compensations in restoring 
cooperation. Note, however, that both the small and the large compensations used 
in Bottom et al. (2002) did not cover the victim’s economic loss entirely. This is 
an important point to make, because given the above stated preoccupation with 
outcomes in economic exchange relations, when a violation is paired with a clear 
financial loss, as it is the case in most incidents of distributive harm, the size of 
this loss could be an important anchor point for victims when evaluating a 
financial compensation. Therefore, if we want to study the effect of the size of a 
compensation, we believe it is essential to compare compensations that vary 
relative to the victim’s perceived loss: Does one need to repay the exact amount 
(exact compensation) to restore trust, or is it enough to provide a smaller financial 
gift to signal repair intentions (partial compensation)? Or maybe the transgressor 
ought to show even more goodwill, by giving back more than the initial loss 
(overcompensation). Research to date has not yet provided an answer to this 
question. 
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Insights from the distributive justice literature would suggest that victims 
will be mainly concerned with the degree to which this compensation re-
establishes equal or equitable outcomes (e.g. Greenberg, 1982; Messick, 1993; 
Rabin, 1998). According to this view, one would expect victims to be more 
satisfied with an exact compensation of their loss than with a compensation that 
only partially restores their loss.  However, scholars have suggested that the 
process of repairing trust may call for a different strategy than building trust 
initially, requiring efforts that are larger in magnitude than those needed for initial 
trust development (Kim et al., 2004). Therefore, when it comes to restoring 
perceptions of trustworthiness, the act of repairing trust may ask more from a 
transgressor than simply restoring the outcome situation that a victim already 
expected to get in the first place (i.e., an equal share; Messick, 1993).  
According to this view, trust might be restored further if the transgressor 
shows that he is willing to go the extra mile to maintain this relationship. 
Following the calculus-based view on trust in exchange relations, a transgressor 
can do this by providing a compensation that constitutes a financial self-sacrifice 
that is more costly than a simple restoration of the distributive harm. Indeed, in 
economic relations, where interactions consist solely of the exchange of outcomes 
and the favorability of these outcomes serves as a reference for inferring one’s 
intentions and trustworthiness (lewicki et al., 2005), adding an extra compensation 
over the exact compensation could be more beneficial in signaling good intentions.  
This idea also fits well with research showing that financial self-sacrifice 
promotes more cooperation and compliance (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 
2002, 2004) and with research showing that overcompensation can be evaluated 
more positively when the other party is satisfied with the unequal distribution (De 
Cremer & Van Kleef, 2009). Moreover, recent findings in economic exchange 
relations have indicated that victims are in fact sensitive to the degree to which the 
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reparation incurs a financial loss for the transgressor: Ohtsubo and Watanabe 
(2009) observed that the more costly an apology is to the transgressor, the more 
favorable victims’ reactions are when they receive it. Finally, findings in consumer 
behavior too have indicated that in the event of a service failure, 
overcompensation of the harm can result in more customer satisfaction than an 
exact compensation of the harm done (Boshoff, 1997; Webster & Sundaram, 1998; 
Davidow, 2003; Gilly & Hansen, 1985).  
Building on these views and findings, we would expect that in economic 
exchange relations, trust can be restored more by a compensation that exceeds the 
harm done, as compared to a compensation that exactly restores the injustice. 
However, we also know from other literature that even in economic exchange 
relations, the favorability of the outcome may not always guide people’s behavior 
when other information is available that indicates the allocating party’s intentions 
and trustworthiness (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; 
Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972; Tyler & Lind, 1992). 
Specifically, in the restorative justice literature, it has been postulated that 
whereas in the case of unintentional harm people take into account the favorability 
of the compensations, they do not consider the provision of a compensation 
satisfactory when harm is inflicted intentionally (Hogan & Emler, 1981; Horai, 
1977; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; Darley & Pittman, 2003). In line 
with this idea, we reason that whether larger compensations will foster more trust, 
depends on the degree to which victims could attribute bad intent to the 
transgressor. 
 
2.1.2 Intent ambiguity as a moderator of financial compensation effects 
 
Prior research has demonstrated that when equality expectations are 
violated, people are motivated to seek explanations (Blount, 1995; Stouten et al., 
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2006). In the search for explanations for this unfair behavior, people especially 
pay attention to information pertaining to intentionality and responsibility 
(Greenberg, 1990; Rutte & Messick, 1995; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 2003). 
Interestingly, attributions about intentions are also seen as an important factor 
influencing trust perceptions. As trust has been referred to as confidence in 
another’s intentions and motives (Deutsch, 1960; Mellinger, 1956), most 
researchers now agree that not only expectations about behavior but also 
perceptions of intent constitute crucial elements in the concept of trust (Rousseau 
et al., 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Schoorman, Davis & Mayer, 2007). Therefore, it 
stands to reason that in the case of trust violations, victims will be motivated to 
know whether the transgressor had bad intentions or not and will use this 
information about intentions as a highly diagnostic criterion to base their future 
trust on. Consequently, a victim’s attribution of intent can play an important role 
in how subsequent restoration attempts will be evaluated and affect trust.  
Research by Kim and colleagues (2004; 2006) provides supporting 
evidence that information pertaining to the intentions of the transgressor indeed 
influences how subsequent repair efforts affect trust. Kim et al. (2004) had 
participants assume the role of a manager who had to evaluate a job candidate 
based on a videotaped interview. At his/her previous employment, this candidate 
had been accused of having misfiled a tax return either intentionally or due to 
inadequate knowledge. The authors found that when applicants were accused of an 
intentional violation, they were trusted more if they denied culpability than if they 
apologized (Kim et al., 2004). If, however, an apology was offered in the case of 
an intentional violation, it was better for the candidate to mitigate the blame to 
external factors (bad advice from others) than to take full responsibility (Kim et 
al., 2006). These findings thus demonstrate that when a violation is viewed as 
intentional, strategies to repair trust (i.e. apologies) may be less effective. 
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In economic exchange relations too, Schweitzer et al. (2006) identified 
perceptions of intent as a crucial element determining the success of future trust 
repair attempts. In their study, participants played a multiple round trust game as 
trustors who had to make investments in a fictitious trustee (see Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe, 1995 for a detailed description of the trust game). What Schweitzer et al. 
(2006) found was that after a violation (not returning the trustor’s investment), 
trust could be restored to some extent by a series of trustworthy actions, combined 
or not with either a promise, an apology or both. Trust, however, never fully 
recovered when the transgressor’s negative intentions became clear through the 
use of deception, despite goodwill operations such as apologies, promises and a 
series of trustworthy actions in the next rounds. 
These studies by Kim et al. (2004; 2006) and Schweitzer et al. (2006) 
suggest that once a violation can be attributed to a transgressor’s bad intent, 
positive restorative acts to communicate trustworthiness such as apologies or 
promises become less effective in repairing trust, whereas when it is less easy to 
attribute intent, victims are more susceptible to an offender’s reparative actions 
(see also Struthers et al., 2008). Kim and colleagues (2004; 2006) explained these 
results by stating that information about the intentionality of a trust violation 
conveys important negative information about a transgressor’s integrity (an 
important determinant of trust, Mayer et al., 1995). When forming an impression, 
these authors argue, people tend to weigh negative information regarding 
someone’s integrity more heavily than positive information about one’s integrity 
(Kim et al., 2004,2006; Reeder & Brewer, 1979). Therefore, when a trust violation 
can be attributed to bad intent, the negative (and thus highly diagnostic) 
information about one’s integrity will outweigh the positive (and thus less 
diagnostic) information of an apology when deciding to trust again. As a result, 
once a transgression can be attributed to bad intent, victims will be less sensitive to 
the positive information comprised in the offender’s reparations. 
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We believe that in economic exchange relations, a similar attribution 
process will underlie the effectiveness of financial compensations. More precisely, 
we hypothesize that when it is ambiguous whether a violation was intentional, 
victims will indeed use the financial compensation and its size to determine the 
other’s trustworthiness and their trust (cf. calculus-based trust). However, when a 
violation can be clearly attributed to bad intent, victims will discount this negative 
information more strongly (see Reeder & Brewer, 1979, Kim et al., 2004, 2006) 
and hence will be less sensitive to the financial compensation and the goodwill 
that its size conveys.  
Recent findings by neuroscientists investigating trust in economic 
exchange relations also provide support for this hypothesis. Delgado, Frank and 
Phelps (2005) examined how prior information about the integrity of an interaction 
partner influenced subsequent trust game behavior. These authors found that 
whereas normally trust in these relations is guided by a reward feedback system in 
which agents base their trust on the rewards they receive from the trustee (i.e. 
calculus-based trust), when negative information regarding the trustee’s integrity 
was provided prior to the interaction, trustors were less inclined to base their 
decision to trust on the outcomes they received from the trustee, despite the fact 
that these outcomes signaled trustworthiness. 
In the restorative justice literature too, it has been argued that whereas in 
the case of unintentional harm victim’s reactions are shaped by the favorability of 
the compensation they receive, when harm is intentional, outcome favorability will 
matter less (Darley & Pittman (2003). The rationale behind this assertion is that 
when distributive harm is inflicted unintentionally, the only harm done is 
distributive, whereas when a transgressor purposely violates norms of distributive 
justice, this violation of intentionality also needs to be addressed. Therefore, it has 
been argued that in the case of intentional violations, the favorability of the 
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compensation will matter less since both instrumental and relational concerns need 
to be addressed (Okimoto & Tyler, 2007; Tyler et al., 1997).  
Overall, these studies suggest that if bad intent can be attributed to the 
transgressor, a goodwill operation by the transgressor to signal his/her regained 
good intentions may be of less value to the victims than when the transgressor’s 
bad intentions were not that clear. In line with this thought, we hypothesize that if 
the intentions of the transgressor to act unfairly are abundantly clear, the violated 
party may be quite certain that building up a relationship with the transgressor is 
not viable (i.e. victims will display less willingness to give the other the benefit of 
the doubt). Thus, in this situation, we believe that an overcompensation may not 
make a transgressor seem more credible and will not restore trust more than an 
exact compensation. However, in the situation in which the intentions of the 
transgressor are less obvious, the violated party should be more inclined to give 
the transgressor the benefit of the doubt. Under this condition, people will show 
more willingness to take into account information communicating the violator’s 
benign intent (i.e. the favorability of the compensation). As such, an offer from the 
transgressor to over-compensate the financial harm done to the victim will more 
effectively influence the violated party’s trust.  
 
2.1.3 The present research 
 
Thus far, some evidence exists that financial compensations in economic 
exchange relations may have the potential to positively influence trust, but under 
which conditions this approach will be most effective still remains empirically 
uncertain.  
We hypothesize that the positive impact of financial compensations will 
be a function of how clear the intentions of the transgressor were in the 
transgression. More precisely, we expect an overcompensation to promote trust 
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more than an exact compensation or a partial compensation, but only so when the 
transgressor’s intention to transgress was not clear. In this case, victims will be 
more likely to give the transgressor the benefit of the doubt, as such providing 
some leeway for the transgressor to do his or her utter best to convince the victim 
of his/her good intentions (e.g. by providing overcompensation)2. If bad intentions, 
however, became clear throughout the violation (through the use of deception or 
by an overt statement indicating bad intent), the favorability of the compensation 
will matter less in such a way that overcompensation will not reveal any additional 
benefits relative to an exact compensation.  
We tested this hypothesis across four experiments in which we 
operationalized trust in terms of judgments and behavior.  
 
2.2 EXPERIMENT 2.1 
 
Experiment 1 consisted of a scenario study. For this purpose, we made use 
of a simple yet concise allocation paradigm rooted in a dictator game. In the 
dictator game, resources have to be divided between two players. Each round, one 
player (the dictator) receives a certain endowment and can then decide how much 
of this endowment he/she wishes to allocate to the other player (recipient). As the 
recipient has to accept the offer made by dictator, his or her outcome fully depends 
on the dictator’s decision. When being played over multiple rounds, however, 
                                                           
2 We condcted a pilot stdy to verify whether trust is indeed violated when an unfair offer is given in a dictator 
game (n=135). Therefore, trust was assessed before and after a violation occurred. Results confirmed that initial 
trust (M = 3.69, SD = 0.09) was reduced following an unfair allocation (M ambiguous = 2.99, SD = 0.13; 
F(1,133) = 15.16, p < .001) or an unfair allocation accompanied by deception (M clear = 2.41, SD = 0.13; 
F(1,133) = 83.19, p < .001). In the same study we also assessed the degree to which participants were willing to 
give the transgressor the benefit of the doubt following a violation with ambiguous or clear intentions. Results 
indicated that following the act of solely receiving an unfair allocation (ambiguous condition), participants 
displayed more willingness to give the transgressor the benefit of the doubt (F(1,133) = 7.74, p < .01, M 
ambiguous = 3.88, SD = 0.18), than when the transgressor had also lied about the distribution (M clear = 3.18, SD 
= 0.18). 
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mutual interdependence between players can be induced by altering the roles 
(dictator or recipient) of the players each round. 
In the scenario, participants were confronted with a situation in which they 
were victim of an unfair allocation made by another person. Following this 
violation, the transgressor offered a financial compensation as a response to this 
unfair distribution. The size of the compensation was manipulated across three 
levels. Participants could receive a compensation that provided both parties with 
equal final outcome distributions (exact compensation), changed the unequal 
distribution in favor of the victim (overcompensation) or restored the distribution 
close to, but still fails to reach equality (partial compensation).  
In light of our research questions, the use of the dictator paradigm has the 
advantage that it allows us to zoom in on how an unfair offer affects trust 
perceptions in a direct way, as the recipient is not able to reject the offer. 
Furthermore, the fact that the recipient cannot influence his or her outcome (as it is 
the case in bargaining games and prisoner’s dilemmas) also allows us to 
manipulate the exact size of the compensation in a more controlled manner in a 
second phase of the game: the partial, exact and overcompensation can be directly 
based on the sole actions of the violator, without having to take into account the 
victim’s prior behavior. 
While most empirical studies on trust repair solely measured end-state 
trust, i.e. an absolute measure of trust following the repair attempt (Kim et al., 
2004, 2006), we agree with recent theorizing that in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of repair efforts properly, it is necessary to look at the relative 
increases in trust perceptions they foster (Dirks et al., 2009). Therefore, in the 
present experiment, we assessed trust repair more directly by employing a relative 
measure, in which we measured trust twice: one time prior to the repair attempt 
and a second time after the repair attempt. Assessing particular perceptions of trust 
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across time hence allowed us to evaluate the efficiency of the different 
compensations by comparing the degree to which they promote increases in trust. 
 
2.2.1 Method 
  
Participants and design. 132 participants (65.2 % female, 34.8% male) 
were recruited at a Dutch university and randomly assigned to one of the six 
experimental conditions of our 2 (Violation type: ambiguous or clear) x 3 
(compensation size partial, exact or over-compensation) x 2 (repeated measures of 
trust) design. Participants were on average 20 years old (SD = 2.23 years) and all 
participants volunteered to participate in a “decision-making experiment”. 
Participants’ trust was measured prior to and after the financial compensation was 
given, thereby creating a within-subjects variable (trust, 2 levels: prior to vs. after 
the unfair allocation).  
Experimental procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were 
escorted to separate cubicles and were given a questionnaire.  
Violation manipulation. The scenario explained to participants that they 
were working as a software engineer at the R&D department of a successful 
software company. They were told that they were working on a number of 
research tasks together with another software engineer. Participants were 
explained that they and the other performed the same amount of research and that 
the quality of the work done was similar. One of the team members then received 
a certain amount of money, which had to be divided between the two of them for 
the purpose of this research. This amount was presented as a quantity of units of 
which each unit represented the value of 1000 Euros. It was further said that by 
chance it was decided that the other person had to distribute the sum for this 
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month. Participants were informed that the amount of money to be distributed 
could vary, but on average consisted of 10 units.  
Subsequently, participants in the clear violation condition read that their 
co-worker emailed them the following message:  “I received 10 units to distribute 
this month, so I decide to give you 5”. In the ambiguous violation condition, 
participants received a message simply stating that their co-worker had decided to 
give 5 units to them. After the allocation was made, participants in both conditions 
read that their co-worker in reality had 20 units to distribute. This information 
hence made it clear to participants that an unfair distribution happened in which 
participants ended up with 5 units, while the transgressor kept 15 units. 
Financial compensation manipulation. Participants were then asked to 
imagine that they had sent the co-worker an email in which they addressed the 
(unfair) distribution of this month. They read that the co-worker responded by 
saying that, “Concerning this month’s distribution, I have decided to give you x 
units extra.” This amount of units (x) was manipulated over three levels. In the 
exact financial compensation condition, participants were told that the other had 
decided to give them 5 extra units, resulting in a final equal 10 -10 distribution 
(i.e. exact financial compensation). In the partial compensation condition, 
participants were told that their co-worker had given 4 extra units, making a final 
distribution in which participants ended up with 9 units and their co-worker with 
11. Participants in the overcompensation condition received 6 extra units, resulting 
in a distribution in which participants ended up with 11 units, while their co-
worker ended up with 9 units. Note that these last two conditions still depict 
unequal outcomes, but differ in the direction of the asymmetry: In the partial 
compensation condition, the transgressor still ends up with more than the victim, 
while in the overcompensation condition the transgressor decides to give the 
victim even more than an equal share. 
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Assessment of trust (restoration). After it was communicated to 
participants that the co-worker in reality possessed 20 units to distribute, trust 
towards the co-worker was measured using three items (7-point Likert scales, 
based on De Cremer, 2004; Mayer et al. 1995, benevolence). The items included 
were: (1) do you think this person is trustworthy?; (2) do you think this person will 
take your interest into account?; (3) do you think this person will take his own 
interest into account? (reverse scored). These scores were combined into a general 
measure of (violated) trust towards the other player (Cronbach’s α = .62). The very 
same questions were asked after participants were informed that the co-worker 
provided a financial compensation (Cronbach’s α = .81).  
 
2.2.2 Results  
 
Manipulation checks. To verify whether our violation type manipulation 
was successful, we asked participants on a 7-point Likert scale to what degree they 
felt that their co-worker had deceived them. We conducted a 2 (violation type: 
ambiguous or clear) x 3 (compensation size) ANOVA on the participants’ score on 
this item. Results revealed a main effect for violation type, F(1,126) = 25.38, p 
<.001 , η2 = .17, indicating that participants in the clear violation condition (M = 
6.50, SD = 0.18) reported feeling significantly more deceived than participants in 
the ambiguous violation condition (M = 5.23, SD = 0.18). 
Trust restoration. We conducted a 2 (violation type) x 3 (compensation 
size) x 2 (trust: prior to vs. after the unfair allocation) Repeated Measures 
ANOVA with the latter factor being the within-subject factor. The results of this 
ANOVA are presented in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1:  Results of the Repeated Measures ANOVA for Experiment 2.1 with Trust as 
within-subjects dependent variable and Compensation Size and Violation Type as Independent 
between-subjects Variables.  
Source df F Partial η2 P 
Within Subjects     
Trust 1 158.29 .56 0.00 
Trust × Compensation Size 2 13.06 .17 0.00 
Trust × Violation Type 1 .75 .01 .39 
Trust × Compensation Size × Violation Type 2 4.35 .07 .02 
Error 126  (0.70)    
Between Subjects 
   
 
Compensation Size 2 11.28 .15 0.00 
Violation Type 1 1.59 .01 0.21 
Compensation Size × Violation Type 2 2.93 .04 .06 
Error 126  (0.99)    
Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
 
First, we examined the main effect for our repeated trust measure. The 
significant effect indicated that trust increased following a financial compensation, 
F(1,126) = 158.29, p < .001, η2 = .56. Consistent with the findings of Bottom et al. 
(2002), our findings indicated that violated trust (M = 1.74, SD = 0.06) was 
restored to some extent by providing a compensation (M = 3.04, SD = 0.10). 
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Closer examination of this effect (post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction) showed that compensations increased trust significantly in all six 
experimental conditions.  
Also, a significant two-way interaction effect between trust and 
compensation size emerged, revealing that the increase in trust depended on the 
size of the compensation, F(2,126) = 13.06, p < .001, η2 = .17: larger 
compensations elicited more trust repair. Furthermore, a significant three-way 
interaction confirmed our interaction hypothesis by indicating that the degree to 
which violated trust increased, depended on the interplay between violation type 
and compensation size, F(2, 126) = 4.35, p < .05, η2 = .07.  
To examine whether this three-way interaction followed the predicted pattern, we 
performed a series of comparisons. The mean increases in trust are displayed in 
Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2:  Mean Increase in Trust (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of Violation Type 
and Financial Compensation Size for Experiment 2.1. 
 
 
Violation Type 
 
Partial Compensation Exact Compensation Overcompensation 
Ambiguous 0.71 (0.25) ab 1.21 (0.26) b 2.26 (0.24) c 
Clear  0.48 (0.24) a 1.82 (0.28) b 1.35 (0.25) b 
Note:  Higher ratings indicate higher levels of trust restoration (mean increase in trust on a 7-point Likert scale). 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Means with different subscripts differ significantly from each other after 
post-hoc comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustment). 
 
Results of the post-hoc comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustment for 
multiple comparisons) confirmed our hypothesis that for people confronted with 
clear intent by the transgressor, trust did not increase more after an 
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overcompensation as compared to an exact compensation, t(126) = 1.24, ns, 
whereas for people in the ambiguous violation condition, receiving an 
overcompensation did increase trust significantly more than when an exact 
compensation was provided, t(126) = 2.99, p < .005. Inspection of these means 
further revealed that in the clear violation condition, trust was restored more 
effectively by an exact compensation than by a partial compensation, t(126) = 
3.65, p < .001, while in the ambiguous violation condition this difference was in 
the same direction, but not significant, t(126) = 1.37, ns. 
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
 
As expected, the results showed that the degree to which trust increases 
depends on the violation type and the compensation size. For people who were 
subjected to a trust violation that did not clearly reveal the violator’s intention (i.e. 
ambiguous violation condition), being offered a financial compensation that 
overcompensated for the unequal distribution did increase trust perceptions more 
than a compensation that restored equality. On the other hand, when bad intent 
was clear to the victim (as deception was used), receiving a financial 
overcompensation did not increase trust towards the transgressor more than an 
exact compensation. Apart from this predicted interaction effect, the results of 
Experiment 2.1 also revealed that trust increased following a compensation, for all 
three manipulated sizes (partial, exact and overcompensation). These results thus 
also support previous findings by Bottom et al. (2002) that (at least substantial) 
financial compensations have the capacity to increase trust. 
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2.3 EXPERIMENT 2.2 
 
The main goal of Experiment 2.2 was to replicate the findings of 
Experiment 2.1, but now in a controlled laboratory experiment. Further, although 
our results were in line with our theoretical framework, we cannot be certain that 
the lack of effect in our “clear violation condition” was due to the fact that in this 
condition the transgressor’s intent to allocate unfairly was clear or because 
deception was used by the transgressor, hence making the violation more extreme. 
Indeed, one could argue that deception aggravates the violation, by adding another 
transgression to the first one: the transgressor not only provides an unfair outcome, 
but also lied about it.  
For that reason, in Experiment 2.2, we included an extra condition in 
which the transgressor made his/her bad intentions clear, but did not aggravate the 
violation by engaging in the act of deception. More precisely, in this additional 
condition, the transgressor made an unfair offer but truthfully communicated the 
amount of resources that he/she had to divide. Following the alternative 
explanation above, one would expect that in this condition, as there is only one 
transgression (unfair distribution) and no deception, similar results would emerge 
as in the ambiguous condition (i.e. trust will increase more by an 
overcompensation than by an exact compensation). However, if it is the ambiguity 
of the transgressor’s bad intent that will determine whether an overcompensation 
can restore trust more than an exact compensation, we would expect no difference 
between the two clear conditions: as both conditions make clear the transgressor’s 
bad intent (by a deceptive or by an honest statement indicating bad intent), an 
overcompensation will not be more effective than an exact compensation in both 
cases. 
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As in Experiment 2.1, financial compensation size was again manipulated 
over three levels (partial, exact, or over-compensation). 
 
2.3.1 Method 
  
Participants and design. 213 participants from a Dutch university (73.6% 
female, 26.4% male) were randomly assigned to one of the nine experimental 
conditions of our 3 (violation type: ambiguous, clear with deception, clear without 
deception) x 3 (compensation size: partial, exact or over-compensation) x 2 
(repeated measures of trust) design. Participants were on average 19 years old (SD 
= 1.74 years) and all volunteered to participate in a “decision-making experiment”. 
As in Experiment 2.1, we assessed participants’ trust perceptions prior to and after 
the financial compensation was given, creating an additional within-subjects 
variable (2 levels).  
Experimental procedure. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants 
were seated in separate cubicles. All instructions were given via the computer.  
Violation manipulation. At the beginning of the experiment, participants 
received instructions that they would be paired with another person present in the 
lab with whom they would engage in multiple rounds of an interaction task. 
Participants learned that each round, an amount of chips were to be allocated to 
one player, who then had to decide how much of these chips he/she would keep, 
and how much he/she would allocate to the other. The chips were said to have a 
financial value, as participants were told that the more chips they earned, the more 
chance they would have in winning a lottery prize of 20 Euros. Participants were 
informed that the number of chips that the allocator could distribute each round 
could vary, but on average would be 10 chips. Next, participants were told that 
each round the computer would randomly decide who would be the allocator and 
who would be the recipient (alternating roles). After these instructions, all 
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participants were informed that the other participant would start off to allocate the 
chips in the first round. In reality, participants would only play one round with a 
fictitious other player. 
Similar to Experiment 2.1, participants in the clear (deception) violation 
condition, then received a message from the other player stating:  “I received 10 
chips to distribute, so I decided to give you 5”. In the ambiguous violation 
condition, participants viewed a message simply stating that the other person 
decided to give five chips to them. In addition to these two, a second clear 
violation condition was created in which no deception was used. In this clear (no 
deception) violation condition, participants received the following message from 
the other player: “I received 20 chips to distribute, so I decided to give you 5”. 
After this allocation, participants in all three conditions received a brief overview 
with respect to the allocations that were made, including information about how 
many chips there were to be distributed and how many chips each party received. 
Here, participants in all three conditions became aware that the other player in 
reality had received 20 chips to distribute. 
Financial compensation manipulation. Participants were then informed 
that the other player had been offered the possibility to re-evaluate his/her 
allocation and was given the opportunity to re-allocate the chips given to oneself 
or not. Following this intervention, participants received a message from the other 
person noting that he/she had decided to give away a certain amount of chips. This 
manipulation was exactly the same as in Experiment 2.1, including an exact 
compensation condition (final distribution is 10 chips for the transgressor and 10 
for the participant), an overcompensation condition (final distribution is 9 chips 
for the transgressor and 11 for the participant), and a partial compensation 
condition (final distribution results in 11 chips for the transgressor and 9 for the 
participant).    
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Assessment of trust (restoration). As in Experiment 2.1, after 
participants discovered that the other player had in reality 20 chips to distribute, 
trust towards the other player was measured using three items (7-point Likert 
scales, based on De Cremer, 2004; Mayer et al. 1995, benevolence). The items 
included were: (1) do you think you can trust this person?; (2) do you think this 
person is trustworthy?; (3) do you think this person will take your interest into 
account? These scores were combined into a general measure of (violated) trust 
towards the other player (Cronbach’s α = .71). The very same questions were 
asked after the participants were informed that the other had provided a financial 
compensation (Cronbach’s α = .75). 
 
2.3.2 Results  
 
Manipulation checks. Several checks were included to verify whether 
participants correctly interpreted the information about the transactions (such as 
how many chips the other player had to divide, how much he/she decided to give 
or keep and how much compensation they received). 12 Participants failed to 
answer a substantial amount of these questions correctly and were removed from 
the sample, leaving a total of 201 participants included in further analyses.  
To make sure that our violation manipulation was adequate in terms that 
participants would expect an equal division (an expectation that would be violated 
by the offer of the allocator), we conducted a separate pilot study (n = 58). To 
verify whether participants expected an equal distribution, participants were asked 
to give a distribution that they would expect. 50 participants (86.2 %) indicated 
that they expected an equal distribution, 8 participants expected an unequal 
distribution in favor of the other.  
To check whether our violation type manipulation was successful, 
following the unfair allocation, participants answered on a 7-point Likert scale to 
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what degree the other had deceived them. A significant main effect of violation 
type was found, F(2,55) = 44.20, p < .001, η2 = .62. Closer examination of this 
effect (post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment) showed that participants 
in the clear (deception) violation condition (M = 6.50, SD = 0.34) felt significantly 
more deceived than participants in the clear (no deception) violation condition (M 
= 2.47, SD = 0.35, p < .001) or in the ambiguous violation condition (M = 2.53, 
SD = 0.35, p < .001). Participants in the ambiguous violation condition did not feel 
more deceived than participants in the clear (no deception) violation condition. To 
verify whether participants in both clear conditions also attributed more intent to 
the transgression, participants were asked to what degree they thought the 
transgressor made the distribution intentionally (7-point likert scale). The 
significant main effect, F(2,55) = 12.86, p < .001, η2 = .32, and post-hoc 
comparisons (Bonferroni adjusted) showed that participants in the ambiguous 
violation condition (M = 3.95, SD = 0.31) were less inclined to think that the 
transgressor made the distribution intentionally than participants in the clear 
(deception) violation condition (M = 6.00, SD = 0.31, p < .001) and clear (no 
deception) violation condition (M = 5.74, SD = 0.31, p < .001).       
Trust restoration. The results of Experiment 2.2 were very much in line 
with those of Experiment 2.1. A 3 (Violation type: ambiguous/clear 
deception/clear no deception) x 3 (compensation size) x 2 (trust) Repeated 
Measures ANOVA with the latter factor being a within-subject factor was 
conducted. The results of this ANOVA are presented in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3:  Results of the Repeated Measures ANOVA for Experiment 2.2 with Trust as 
within-subjects dependent variable and Compensation Size and Violation Type as Independent 
between-subjects Variables.  
Source df F Partial η2 P 
Within Subjects     
Trust 1 494.26 .72 0.00 
Trust × Compensation Size 2 6.49 .06 0.00 
Trust × Violation Type 2 .88 .01 .42 
Trust × Compensation Size × Violation Type 4 2.86 .06 .03 
Error 192  (0.51)    
Between Subjects     
Compensation Size 2 1.24 .01 29 
Violation Type 2 3.37 .03 .04 
Compensation Size × Violation Type 4 1.34 .03 .26 
Error 192  (1.05)    
Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
 
As in Experiment 2.1, the significant main effect for our repeated trust 
measure indicated that trust increased following a financial compensation, 
F(1,192) = 494.26, p < .001, η2 = .72. Consistent with the results of Experiment 
2.1 and the findings of Bottom et al. (2002), violated trust (M = 3.11, SD = 0.06) 
increased to some extent by providing a compensation (M = 4.71, SD = 0.06). 
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Closer examination (pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment) of this 
effect showed the provision of a compensation significantly increased trust in all 
nine experimental conditions. 
In the same ANOVA, a significant two-way interaction effect between 
trust and compensation size revealed that the increase in trust depended on the size 
of the compensation, F(2,192) = 6.49, p = .002, η2 = .063: larger compensations 
elicited more trust repair. Furthermore, the significant three-way interaction 
confirmed our interaction hypothesis by indicating that the interplay of violation 
type and compensation size did influence the degree to which violated trust 
increased, F(4,192) = 2.86, p = .025, η2 = .056.  
To examine this three-way interaction more closely, we compared the 
mean increases in trust for our nine conditions. These increases in trust are 
displayed in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4:  Mean Increase in Trust (and Standard Deviations) as a Function of Violation Type 
and Financial Compensation Size for Experiment 2.2. 
 
 
Violation Type 
 
Partial Compensation Exact Compensation Overcompensation 
Ambiguous 1.13 (0.21) a 1.45 (0.21) a 2.44(0.22) b 
Clear no deception 1.23 (0.21) a 1.60 (0.22) a 1.55 (0.20) a 
Clear deception 1.41 (0.22) a 1.87 (0.22) a 1.65 (0.22) a 
Note:  Higher ratings indicate higher levels of trust restoration (mean increase in trust on a 7-point Likert scale). 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Means with different subscripts differ significantly from each other after 
post-hoc comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustment). 
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Results of the Post-Hoc comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustment for 
multiple comparisons) confirmed our findings from Experiment 2.1: for people in 
the ambiguous violation condition, receiving an overcompensation did increase 
trust significantly more than when only an exact compensation was provided, 
t(192) = 3.27, p = .001, whereas this was not the case when trust was violated by 
deception, t(192) = 0.71, ns. Furthermore these comparisons also revealed that in 
the clear (no deception) violation condition, just as in the clear (deception) 
condition, trust also did not increase more after an overcompensation than after an 
exact compensation, t(192) = 0.19, ns. This latter finding thus also provides 
support for our hypothesis that it is not the use of deception that makes an 
overcompensation not more effective than an exact compensation, but rather the 
clarity of intent. 
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 2.2 replicated the findings of Experiment 2.1, 
but now in a controlled laboratory setting.  As expected, our results showed that 
the degree to which trust can be repaired by financial compensations depends on 
the interplay between violation type and the size of the compensation. When 
victims of a trust violation were clearly confronted with the transgressor’s bad 
intentions (through deception or a clear statement of his intent to be unfair), an 
offer to overcompensate the victim did not have an additional positive effect on 
trust perceptions as compared to an exact compensation. When intentions were 
more ambiguous, that is when participants solely received the unfair share without 
the transgressor having lied about it or having stated his bad intent clearly, trust 
perceptions did increase more when a financial overcompensation was offered, 
relative to when an exact, or a partial compensation was offered.  
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Furthermore, the fact that no differences were observed between the two 
clear violation conditions (deception or no deception), provides evidence for the 
notion that it is not the use of deception that causes an overcompensation to (not) 
increase trust more than an exact compensation, but rather a difference in the 
ambiguity of bad intent.  
 
2.4 EXPERIMENT 2.3 
 
Although the results of Experiment 2.1 and 2.2 supported our hypotheses, 
we conducted a third study for several reasons. First of all, we wanted to provide 
more conclusive evidence for our assertion that it is the degree of intent clarity vs. 
intent ambigity rather than the use of deception that moderates the effect of 
compensation size. Despite the inclusion of an additional clear violation condition 
without deception and a separate pilot study that measured the degree to which 
victims attributed intent for all three violation types, one could argue that the 
results of Experiment 2.2 only offer indirect support for this notion becase the 
attribution of intent was not measured within the experiment itself and its 
influence on the observed effects can therefore not directly be proven. Therefore, 
in Experiment 2.3 we took a more rigorous approach and manipulated violation 
type as in Experiment 2.1 (2 levels, Clear-deception or Ambiguous), but now 
measured participants’ attribution of intent directly within the experiment itself. 
As such, this setup allowed us to assess whether attributions of intent mediate the 
moderating effect of violation type on compensation size. More precisely, apart 
from the predicted interaction effect found in Experiment 2.1 and 2.2, we would 
also expect a main effect of violation type on intent attributions. Furthermore, we 
expect the violation type x compensation size interaction to be fully explained by 
an attribution x compensation size interaction.  
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Second, in Experiment 2.1 and 2.2 we measured trust by assessing trust at 
two points in time to evaluate relative increases in trust (before and after the 
compensation, as suggested by Dirks et al. (2009)). This measure yielded 
consistent results, but one might also wonder what the behavioral repercussions on 
victims might look like. Will victims still be willing to be vulnerable to the other’s 
actions, or will they choose to protect themselves from the influence of the other? 
Therefore, in Experiment 2.3, we decided to measure participants’ trust as 
behavior, and after a compensation was provided, gave victims the opportunity to 
either keep interacting with the transgressor, or to exit the interaction and to 
continue the task with another, unknown participant. 
 
2.4.1 Method 
  
Participants and design. 106 participants (62.3 % male, 37.7 % female) 
from a Dutch university were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions of our 2 (Violation type: ambiguous or clear) x 2 (exact or over-
compensation) between subjects design. Participants were on average 20 years old 
(SD = 1.93 years). 
Procedure. The procedure and instructions were identical to those used in 
Experiment 2.2.  
Violation manipulation. As in Experiment 2.2, participants engaged in 
the first round of a dictator game as recipients and in the clear (deception) 
violation condition, they received a message from the other player stating:  “I 
received 10 chips to distribute, so I decided to give you 5”. In the ambiguous 
violation condition, participants received a message stating that the other person 
decided to give five chips to them. Following this allocation, participants in both 
conditions received an overview of the allocations made.  
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Attribution of intent. After the violation but prior to receiving 
compensation, we assessed participants’ attribution of intent to the transgressor’s 
act. Participants answered on 7-point Likert scales to the following questions: “I 
think the current distribution is to be attributed to the other’s intent” and “I think 
the current distribution of chips is more the result of the situation itself than of the 
person allocating the chips” (reverse scored). Both items were combined into a 
scale measuring the degree to which participants attributed bad intent (r = .50, p < 
.001). 
Compensation manipulation. As in Experiment 2.2, participants were 
informed that the other player was given the opportunity to re-allocate the chips 
given to oneself and the other. After a while, participants received a message from 
the transgressor indicating that he/she had decided to give away a certain amount 
of chips. The compensation size manipulation was the same as in Experiment 2.2, 
this time only including the exact compensation condition (with the final payoff 
for both transgressor and participant being10 chips) and the overcompensation 
condition (resulting payoff of 9 chips for the transgressor and 11 for the 
participant). 
 Assessment of exit behavior. Participants were informed that before the 
second round would start, they were given the opportunity to exit the interaction 
with the current interaction partner and choose to continue the experimental task 
with another participant in the lab (binary choice: yes/no).  
 
2.4.2 Results  
 
Manipulation checks. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale to 
what degree they felt that their interaction partner had deceived them. We 
conducted a 2 (violation type: ambiguous/clear) x 2 (compensation size) ANOVA 
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on the participants’ score on this item. Results revealed a main effect for violation 
type, F(1,102) = 36.08, p <.001 , η2 = .26, indicating that participants in the 
ambiguous violation condition (M = 3.81, SD = 0.23) reported feeling significantly 
less deceived than participants in the clear violation condition (M = 5.72, SD = 
0.23). 
Attribution of Intent. A 2 x 2 ANOVA with violation type, 
compensation size and their interaction predicting scores on the attribution of 
intent scale only revealed a main effect of violation type, F(1,102) = 9.76, p <.01 , 
η2 = .09, indicating that participants in the ambiguous violation condition (M = 
3.63, SD = 0.19) were less inclined to attribute bad intent to the act of the 
transgressor than participants in the clear violation condition (M = 4.47, SD = 
0.19). 
Exit behavior. A binary logistic regression analysis with violation type, 
compensation size and their interaction as the predictor variables and exit behavior 
as the dependent variable yielded as predicted a significant interaction effect, 
B = 2.15, SE = .92, Wald’s χ2(1, N = 106) = 5.53, p < .05. The percentages of exit 
choices per condition are displayed in Table 2.5.  
 
Table 2.5: Percentages of Exit Choices as a Function of Violation Type and Financial 
Compensation Size for Experiment 2.3. 
 
 
Violation Type 
Exact Compensation Overcompensation 
Ambiguous 0.71 (0.25) ab 1.21 (0.26) b 
Clear deception 0.48 (0.24) a 1.82 (0.28) b 
Note: Percentages with different subscripts per row differ significantly from each other following separate chi-
square tests for each violation type. 
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To break down the interaction effect, chi-square tests on the variables 
compensation size and exit behavior were conducted separately for people in the 
ambiguous condition and for people in the clear condition. These results showed 
that victims in the ambiguous violation condition were less inclined to exit the 
interaction if the transgressor provided an overcompensation than when the 
transgressor provided an exact compensation, χ2(1) = 6.63, p = .01; Participants in 
the clear violation condition were as likely to exit if the transgressor provided an 
overcompensation as when the transgressor provided an exact compensation, 
χ2(1) = 0.48, ns. 
Mediation analyses. As described above, whereas violation type had a 
main effect on intent attribution, the violation type x compensation size interaction 
significantly affected participants’ exit behavior. To see whether the moderating 
effect of our violation manipulation on the effect of compensation size was due to 
the proposed mechanism of intent attribution, a series of regression models were 
estimated according to the method described by Baron & Kenny (1986).  
As a first step, we assessed whether there was an effect of the interaction 
of violation type and compensation type on exit behavior (see above). We also 
assessed that there was a main effect of violation type on the attribution of intent 
(see above). As a last step, we needed to establish that the violation type x 
compensation type interaction on exit behavior was reduced when the intent 
attribution x compensation size interaction was entered in the regression, whereas 
this latter interaction should be significant. A logistic regression analysis with 
violation type, compensation size, intent attribution (centered) and their 
interactions predicting exit behavior indeed revealed a significant interaction of 
intent attribution and compensation size on exit behavior (B = -1.22, SE = .54, 
Wald’s χ2(1, N = 106) = 5.10, p < .05). Moreover, this analysis showed that the 
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violation type x compensation size interaction completely disappeared (B = 1.72, 
SE = 1.04, Wald’s χ2(1, N = 106) = 2.73, ns), indicating a full mediation.  
 
2.4.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 2.3 replicated the results of Experiment 2.1 and 2.2, but now 
with a behavioral measure of trust: victims who received an overcompensation 
were less inclined to leave the interaction than victims who received an exact 
compensation, but only so when the violation was ambiguous. Furthermore, 
whereas Experiment 2.2 provided only indirect evidence for intent ambiguity 
being the underlying mechanism for our violation type manipulation of 
Experiment 2.1 and 2.2, the mediation analyses in Experiment 2.3 strengthened 
this assertion by showing that the moderated path of violation type is fully 
mediated by the attribution of intent. 
 
2.5 EXPERIMENT 2.4 
 
Experiments 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 all consistently showed that while 
overcompensations can foster more trust than exact compensations when intent is 
ambiguous, when a violation is clearly intentional, overcompensations are not 
more effective than exact compensations. Experiment 2.4 was designed to further 
consolidate this mechanism by manipulating intent ambiguity directly, without any 
interference with deception. 
Also, one could argue that the manipulation of compensation size that we 
used in Experiment 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 was rather subtle. Indeed, receiving one extra 
coin over an equal distribution of 10 is not exactly a large overcompensation. As a 
consequence, it would be difficult to uphold that our findings can be generalized to 
situations in which larger overcompensations are provided.  Therefore, in 
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Experiment 2.4, we increased the size of an overcompensation substantially so that 
participants in the overcompensation condition would receive double the amount 
of compensation awarded in the exact condition.  
Furthermore, Experiment 2.1-2.4 all made use of the same framework, 
rooted in a dictator game. To see whether our findings could be generalized to 
other types of economic exchange relations, in Experiment 2.4, we employed a 
different paradigm, namely a trust game. The trust game, originally designed by 
Berg et al (1995), is a widely used experimental method that allows to measure 
trust as investment decisions in an economic exchange relation. The first agent in 
this game, Player 1 (trustor), receives a certain amount of money and can send any 
part of this endowment to the second agent, Player 2 (trustee). The amount that 
Player 2 receives is then multiplied, after which Player 2 can decide how much of 
this amount he sends back to Player 1. When Player 1 decides to trust Player 2 
(and gives substantially), Player 2 can then decide to act trustworthy (giving a 
substantial amount back to Player 1) or to violate Player 1’s trust (e.g. return little 
or nothing). This context thus also provides us with the interesting opportunity to 
look at how financial compensations affect trust as behavior (i.e. investment 
decisions).  
 
2.5.1 Method 
  
Participants and design. 98 university students (51% female, 49% male) 
were recruited by announcements on the campus. All participants volunteered to 
participate in a “decision-making experiment” that allowed them to earn money. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of our 2 (Intent: 
ambiguous or clear) x 2 (compensation size: exact or over-compensation) between 
subjects design. Participants were on average 20 years old (SD = 2.11 years).  
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Procedure. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated in 
separate cubicles and told that all instructions were given via the computer. 
Participants were not able to see or hear each other during the entire experiment.  
 Trust game. Instructions informed the participants that they would play 
multiple rounds of an interaction task with another person. All participants were 
assigned to the role of Player 1 and interacted with a fictitious Player 2. 
Participants were endowed with 10 chips and were told that the more chips they 
earned, the more chance they would have in winning a lottery prize of 20 Euros. 
Participants were given two options in round 1. They could either decide 
to give all of the 10 chips to Player 2 (trust) or they could choose to give no money 
to the counterpart (no trust). To create an incentive for participants to trust in the 
first round, participants were also told that if they chose the latter option, they 
could only keep half of their original endowment (5 instead of 10 chips). When a 
participant decided not to invest, the experiment ended, and he/she was debriefed 
(7 participants). When participants chose to invest (92 participants), they were 
informed that the amount had been doubled and were asked to wait a few 
moments, while Player 2 made his/her decision. 
Violation manipulation. After some time, participants were notified of 
the possibility that Player 2 did not receive the same information as them in round 
1. They were told that there was a possibility that Player 2 was not aware of the 
fact that the amount sent had been doubled. It was said that therefore it was 
possible that in round 1, Player 2 thought he/she only had 10 chips instead of 20 at 
his disposal when deciding to make the allocation. Participants were also told that 
it was equally possible that Player 2 did know he/she had 20 chips to distribute.   
After this, participants in the clear intent condition received a message 
from Player 2 stating “I received 20 chips and decided to give you 5.” This 
message thus implicated that the other knew he/she had 20 chips to distribute 
Participants in the ambiguous intent condition received a message solely 
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indicating that for that round, the other person had decided to give 5 chips to them. 
In this condition, it was hence unclear whether Player 2 knew he/she had 20 chips. 
Financial compensation manipulation. After some time, as in the 
previous experiments, participants were informed that the other player was given 
the opportunity to re-allocate the chips given to oneself or the other. Participants 
subsequently received a message from Player 2 indicating that he/she had decided 
to give away a certain amount of chips. The size of this compensation was 
manipulated over two levels, creating an exact compensation condition in which 
victims received 5 extra chips, resulting in a 10-10 distribution and a large 
overcompensation condition in which the transgressor provided 10 extra chips, 
creating a final distribution of 5 chips for the transgressor and 15 for the 
participant..  
 Assessment of trust (behavior). The dependent measure of interest was 
victims’ subsequent behavior in a second round of the trust game. For this 
purpose, participants were again endowed with 10 chips and told that for round 2, 
they could choose to give any amount between 0 and 10 chips to the other player.   
 
2.5.2 Results  
 
Manipulation checks. To verify whether our intent manipulation was 
successful, participants answered on a 7-point Likert scale to what degree they 
thought the other made the distribution intentionally. A 2 (Intent: ambiguous/clear) 
x 2 (compensation size: exact vs. overcompensation) ANOVA on the participants’ 
score on this item revealed a main effect for intent ambiguity, F(1,88) = 4.72, p 
<.05 , η2 = .05, indicating that participants in the clear intent condition (M = 4.78, 
SD = 0.21) were more inclined to think that the other made the distribution 
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intentionally, than participants in the ambiguous intent condition (M = 4.15, SD = 
0.21). 
Trust behavior. A 2 (intent ambiguity) x 2 (compensation size) between 
subjects ANOVA on the amount of chips participants were willing to give in the 
second round of the trust game, revealed a main effect of intent ambiguity, F(1,88) 
= 8.08, p <.01 , η2 = .08. This main effect was however qualified by our predicted 
significant interaction effect, F(1,88) = 4.33, p <.05 , η2 = .05. The means are 
displayed in table 2.6.  
 
Table 2.6: Mean Trust Game Allocations (and Standard Deviations) of Victims towards 
Transgressors as a Function of Intent Ambiguity and Compensation Size for Experiment 2.4. 
 
 
Violation Type 
Exact Compensation Overcompensation 
Ambiguous 4.83 (0.74) a 7.61 (0.74) b 
Clear  
 4.26 (0.74) a 3.96 (0.74) a 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Means with different subscripts differ significantly from each other 
(Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment). 
 
Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni adjustment revealed that whereas victims in 
the ambiguous intent condition were inclined to give more to a transgressor who 
provided an overcompensation than to a transgressor who gave an exact 
compensation, t(88) = 2.65, p < .01, victims in the clear intent condition did not 
give more to a transgressor who overcompensated than to a transgressor who 
provided an exact compensation, t(88) = 0.29, ns. 
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2.5.3 Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 2.4 confirmed our previous findings, but now in 
a different setting and using a stronger manipulation of compensation size. In the 
context of a trust game paradigm, we observed that victims trusted a transgressor 
more (by allocating more resources) when this transgressor provided a large 
overcompensation than when he/she provided an exact compensation, but only so 
when there was ambiguity about the transgression being intentional.   
 
2.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Taken together, the present findings provide support to the idea that when 
trust is violated by distributive harm in exchange relations, the size of a financial 
compensation can influence the degree to which victims are willing to trust again. 
Specifically, across four studies, we found evidence that whether larger financial 
compensations will foster more trust, depends on how trust was violated in the 
first place, and more importantly, how victims attributed intent to the violation. 
Below we will discuss the most important theoretical and practical implications. 
The most important finding lies in the observed interaction between 
compensation size and violation type. We reasoned that as trust in economic 
exchange relations is driven mainly by outcomes (calculative trust, lewicki et al., 
2005) one could expect that larger financial compensation foster more trust. 
However, drawing upon insights from the restorative justice literature that 
favorability of outcomes matters more when the intentions of the transgressor are 
not clear (Darley & Pittman, 2003), and building on the notion that information 
about intentions are of crucial diagnostic value for trustors to base their decision to 
trust on (e.g. Rousseau et al., 1998), we predicted that financial 
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overcompensations can indeed foster more trust, but not if bad intent became clear 
throughout the violation. Our findings were indeed in line with these predictions. 
That is, across four experiments and using different paradigms and measures of 
trust, we found that overcompensations only restore trust more when the 
transgression did not explicitly reveal the transgressor’s intent.  
The present findings contribute to the growing literature on trust repair in 
several ways. A first contribution is that we focused our attention on a trust repair 
tool that has received very little empirical attention by trust repair scholars, that is, 
financial compensations. Our results reveal that in the context of economic 
exchange relations, providing a financial compensation in response to distributive 
harm, can also contribute to the process of trust repair. Furthermore, our findings 
also fit within previous insights in the trust repair literature showing that goodwill 
operations by the transgressor, such as apologies or promises, are less effective 
when they follow a transgression that clearly displayed the transgressor’s bad 
intent (Kim et al. 2004, 2006; Schweitzer et al. 2006). We demonstrated that a 
similar logic applies to the effectiveness of compensating a victim in response to 
distributive harm: victims will use the favorability of the compensation (i.e. 
compensation size) in their decision to trust, but only so only when bad intent is 
less clear. 
A second contribution is that we investigated trust repair in a setting that 
has not received much empirical attention yet, that is, economic exchange 
relations. In these relations, actors’ welfare depends on the decisions taken by 
others. The presence of this interdependence subsequently creates strong concerns 
for issues such as trust and fear of exploitation (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). This 
context therefore provides an excellent setting not only for examining the effects 
of distributive harm and subsequent financial compensation, but also for the study 
of violation and restoration of trust in general. 
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In conclusion, as noted by Dirks et al. (2009), for the purpose of 
developing a comprehensive and unified conceptual foundation for the study of 
relationship repair, it is important to consider antecedents and mechanisms of trust 
repair at different levels of analysis. As the specific nature of relations can differ 
(i.e. is the relation purely economic, transactional, or more social, relational?), so 
can the efficiency of a certain repair mechanism vary along these forms. By 
showing how financial compensations can help repairing trust in an economic 
exchange context between individuals, we believe to have taken some important 
first steps in the study of financial compensations as a means to restore trust in 
particular and to the literature on trust repair in general.   
 
2.6.1 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
 A first potential limitation is that our focus was on a one-time encounter 
trust violation and restoration attempt. Although in our experiments, to induce the 
sense of interdependence, we let participants believe that they would interact over 
multiple rounds, in reality they did not play more than one round. This may limit 
our findings in the sense that we did not study how the type of violation and the 
size of a financial compensation will affect how trust evolves over subsequent 
encounters in iterated interactions. Interestingly enough, however, prior research 
has repeatedly shown that first impressions can persevere in iterated interactions 
(Tetlock, 1983; Rabin & Schrag, 1999; Schweitzer et al. 2006), and that an early 
breach in trust can go a long way (Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 
2008). These findings thus stress the relevance of looking at how violated trust in 
these very first moments can be effectively restored again, and by which means 
this can(not) be achieved.  
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A second potential limitation is that we only focused on a repair tactic that 
directly addresses instrumental outcome related concerns (financial 
compensations), and not on less tangible yet more relation-oriented efforts, such as 
apologies. Although we departed from a typical economic exchange framework, in 
which particularly outcome related concerns are salient, research has suggested 
that even in these exchange settings like negotiations or public good dilemmas, not 
only instrumental, financial motives are of value, but also relational concerns 
should be taken into account (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; De Cremer, 2002). 
Interestingly, the same idea can also be found in the justice literature, where it has 
been argued that people not only care about the outcomes they receive, but also 
about the way these outcomes are achieved and the way in which they feel 
respected  (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  
Although discussing the explicit nature of the relationship between trust 
and justice is beyond the scope of the present paper, it is nevertheless important to 
note that in the exchange settings we used, different types of justice may play a 
role in the trust repair process. As we noted earlier, in economic exchange 
relations, a trust violation often involves distributive harm and therefore we 
directed our focus on how dynamics of distributive justice (i.e. financial 
compensations) influence trust repair. In these settings, however, procedural and 
interactional justice concerns can be affected as well, as unequal allocations may 
also signal disrespect and little care about the procedures used to allocate valuable 
resources. This leaves the question whether these concerns should not also be 
addressed.  
One way procedural or interactional justice concerns can be addressed 
when trust is violated, is by offering an apology. As apologies can speak to both 
procedural and interactional justice concerns through the expression of respect and 
the explicit admission that a rule of conduct is violated (De Cremer & Schouten, 
2008; Okimoto & Tyler, 2007), researchers have argued that addressing not only 
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distributive justice concerns, but also these other justice concerns, might result in 
favorable reactions towards transgressors (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Okimoto & 
Tyler, 2007). Therefore, an interesting challenge for future research lies in 
examining the impact of addressing different justice concerns - in combination or 
separately - on trust restoration.  
Finally, another interesting avenue for future research on restoration 
processes in exchange relations is to investigate what level of overcompensation is 
most effective in restoring trust. Whereas in our studies we showed that both small  
(Experiment 2.1-2.3) and large (Experiment 2.4) overcompensations have the 
potential of restoring trust more than an exact compensation, it remains unclear 
whether or not larger overcompensations are more effective than smaller ones. On 
the one hand, a more outcome-based perspective would suggest that because 
outcomes serve as a reference for trustworthiness in exchange relations, a large 
overcompensation might foster more trust than a small overcompensation. On the 
other hand, however, if the effectiveness of overcompensation is due to the more 
symbolic message it communicates that the transgressor is willing to walk the 
extra mile, one would not immediately expect larger overcompensations to foster 
more trust than small overcompensations. Therefore, future research would do 
well to investigate in greater detail whether the level of overcompensation also 
matters to victims in the process of repairing trust. 
 
2.6.2 Conclusion 
 
 Taken together, the present findings show that the size of financial 
compensations can prove to be an important factor determining the degree to 
which trust can be restored. Moreover, we established that the attribution of intent 
plays a crucial role for the effect of compensation size: overcompensations only 
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restored trust more to the extent that the victim attributed less bad intent to the 
transgression. So, it appears more to be the case that eventually, when trusting 
again, victims attach more value to information about intentions, than to the 
favorability of the final outcome. When a transgressor’s intentions are ambiguous, 
victims will base their trust on the size of the compensation they receive, whereas 
when bad intent of the transgressor clearly surfaces throughout the violation, the 
favorability of the compensation matters less. In light of this view, our findings 
thus also seem to substantiate the broader idea that detecting intentions and 
modeling our behavior accordingly, constitute a fundamental and guiding principle 
throughout our interactions with others, a view that already has been held for a 
longer time by game theorists and, more recently, by neuroscientists as well 
(Sanfey, 2007; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). To conclude, we hope that the present 
research will motivate future researchers to focus on how trust violations occur 
and how they can be effectively dealt with. After all, if no trust is available or only 
distrust is present, no type of social or economic encounter will be viable in the 
long-term.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. SIZE MATTERS PART 2: WHEN INTENTIONS DETERMINE 
VALUE3 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Trust is a helpful lubricant in many of our social interactions. One type of 
relations in which trust plays a pivotal role are economic exchange relations, 
relations characterized by resource-based dependencies where people have to 
decide how to allocate tangible, financial resources (Granovetter, 1985, Uzzi, 
1996, 1997). In these relations, trust not only helps us overcome the fear of 
exploitation and stimulates us to engage in interactions in the first place, but it also 
encourages us to be more benevolent and cooperative towards our interaction 
partners (Parks, Henager, & Scamahorn, 1996; De Cremer et al., 2001). Despite all 
the benefits that the presence of trust may foster in economic exchange relations, 
reality has taught us that actors in these relations often jeopardize another’s trust 
by violating moral standards and treating the other party unfairly (Boles, Croson & 
Murnighan, 2000; O’connor and Carnevale, 1997; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994).  
Given the fact that economic exchange relations are not immune to the 
negative impact on trust that such violations of fairness norms can bring forth 
(Bies & Tripp, 1996; Jones & George, 1998; Lount et al., 2008), an important 
challenge for economic exchange relations today lies in dealing effectively with 
fairness violations and in unraveling how violated trust can be restored. Although 
some research has examined how apologies or other verbal offender accounts like 
promises or denials can facilitate the restoration of trust in general (Kim et al., 
2004; Tomlinson et al., 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006), empirical work has only 
                                                           
3 This chapter is based on Desmet, De Cremer & Van Dijk (2011b) 
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recently begun to investigate how in economic exchange relations, where a trust 
violation often entails a financial loss, the provision of financial compensations 
may have a positive influence in the process of repairing trust and cooperation. 
(Bottom et al., 2002; Desmet et al., 2011; De Cremer, 2010).  
Outcome-based models of game theory and narrow calculus-based views 
on trust would predict that as outcomes are of primary concern for actors in 
economic exchange relations, the provision of a substantial financial compensation 
would indeed be a sufficient restorative tactic in response to distributive harm 
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Lewicki et al., 2005; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999). Moreover, these views would also suggest that the more 
resources victims receive as compensation, the more they will be willing to trust 
and cooperate again. However, if we look at research conducted so far within the 
realm of economic exchange relations, it appears that all studies have a common 
focus on reparations that are voluntarily initiated by the transgressor. In the course 
of real-life violations, however, voluntary acts of repair appear to be an exception 
rather than a rule, as actors in economic exchange relations often let a third party 
decide whether and what reparation is appropriate (cf. tort litigation).  
As the way in which people take action signals important information 
about their motives and intentions, it remains to be seen whether restorative 
attempts will exert the same positive effects when the transgressor did not 
voluntarily initiate them and had to be ordered to by a third party (Goranson & 
Berkowitz, 1966; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972). In the present research, we 
examined in the context of a trust game how victims are willing to trust again 
following the provision of a financial compensation. In this setting, we 
investigated whether victims will be sensitive to the size of the compensation in 
their decision to trust again and develop the argument that larger compensations 
will only foster more trust if they are provided voluntarily rather than following 
coercion by a third party.  
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3.1.1 Repairing Trust with Financial Compensations 
 
Despite the widespread use of compensations in response to distributive 
harm, not many studies have investigated their effect on cooperation and trust. 
Therefore, to assess what factors may influence the efficiency of financial 
compensations in economic exchange relations, it is useful to first elaborate on 
what has been argued to drive trust in these economic exchange relations.  
Trust scholars agree that trust can be shaped by different concerns 
depending on the type of relation it functions in (Rousseau et al., 1998; Sheppard 
& Sherman, 1998; Lewicki et al., 1998; Dirks et al., 2009). In economic exchange 
relations, where interactions take place primarily through giving and receiving 
economic goods, trust scholars have argued that trust is more a market-oriented, 
economic calculation. Specifically, rather than being driven by an identification 
with the other’s desires and motives, actors in these relations base their trust on the 
expectancy of receiving a specific, tangible benefit (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; 
Lewicki et al., 2005). According to this calculus-based view on trust in exchange 
relations, people will particularly look at the favorability of the outcomes they 
receive when deriving one’s intentions and trustworthiness. 
Given this primary concern with outcomes in exchange relations, scholars 
have speculated that the provision of a financial compensation in response to 
distributive harm might be an important and effective step in the process of 
restoring trust in economic exchange relations (Lewicki et al., 2005; Ren & Gray, 
2009). Bottom et al. (2002) provided empirical support for this assertion: focusing 
on cooperation in a dyadic multiple round prisoner’s dilemma, these authors 
observed that after a breach by the other party, cooperation could be re-established 
to some extent when the transgressor offered substantive financial compensation. 
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Interestingly, these authors also investigated whether the size of the compensation 
was relevant to this process, and concluded that this had no effect: small offers of 
compensation were as effective as larger ones. 
Important to note, however, is that both the small and large compensations 
that Bottom et al. (2002) employed, failed to cover the economic loss for the 
victim. Given that violations in economic exchange relations usually result in a 
clear financial loss for the victim, and given that outcomes are of great importance 
to actors in economic exchange relations (Lewicki et al. 2005), it is plausible that 
the size of this loss will be a crucial anchor point for victims when they evaluate a 
financial compensation. From a distributive justice perspective, one would indeed 
expect that victims of distributive harm will be concerned with the degree to which 
a compensation re-establishes fair outcomes (e.g. Greenberg, 1982; Messick, 
1993; Rabin, 1998). Therefore, a compensation that exactly restores a victim’s 
monetary loss or creates equal outcomes again would seem a minimum necessity 
for restoring trust and cooperation.  
Although the provision of a compensation that generates equal or 
equitable outcomes may seem a sufficient response to distributive harm from a 
distributive justice point of view, trust scholars have suggested that the process of 
restoring trust may require more effort than what is needed to build trust initially 
(Kim et al., 2004). The act of restoring trust may therefore ask for more from a 
transgressor than simply restoring the unfair outcome distribution to the equal 
distribution that a victim already expected to get in the first place. Given the above 
mentioned importance of outcomes for trust in exchange relations, one way this 
might be achieved, is for the transgressor to provide a compensation that 
overcompensates for the harm done and signals a financial self-sacrifice for the 
transgressor.  
As prior research has already documented that financial self-sacrifice can 
foster more cooperation (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004), recent 
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findings in exchange relations have indicated that victims react more favorable to 
restorative attempts when they are costly for the transgressor (Ohtsubo & 
Watanabe, 2009). In the context of a dictator game, Ohtsubo and Watanabe (2009) 
observed that when victims received an apology from a transgressor who 
previously behaved in an unfair manner, they were sensitive to the degree to which 
this apology incurred a financial loss for the transgressor: victims reacted more 
positively to costly apologies than to less costly apologies.  
Insights from the literature on consumer behavior also suggest that larger 
compensations may be more effective than smaller ones. In studying victim’s 
responses to service failures, several authors observed that overcompensation of 
the harm done resulted in more consumer satisfaction than exact or partial 
compensation (Boshoff, 1997; Webster & Sundaram, 1998; Davidow, 2003; Gilly 
& Hansen, 1985). Moreover, recent findings in the context of economic exchange 
relations have shown that the size of a compensation can also have an influence on 
the degree to which a victim’s trust is restored and to what degree victims are 
willing to continue interacting with the transgressor. Desmet et al. (2011a) not 
only observed that a compensation that restores equality can increase trust, but 
also that an overcompensation that creates unequal outcomes in favor of the victim 
can increase victims’ trust towards a transgressor even more. 
 
3.1.2 Voluntariness and the importance of intentions for trust 
 
 In light of the empirical evidence above, one would expect victims of 
distributive harm in economic exchange relations to be sensitive to the size of a 
compensation. The more resources they receive as compensation, the more they 
are willing to trust again. This suggests that victims mainly care about the 
outcomes they receive and that trust in these relations can be regarded as an 
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economic good of which more can be bought when more compensation is 
provided. As such, this notion seems consistent with outcome-based models in 
behavioral game theory, which posit that actors in economic exchange relations 
base their decisions solely on the favorability of the outcomes they receive (e.g. 
Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
However, although scholars agree that outcomes are of great importance 
to actors in economic exchange relations, recent economic theories have departed 
from the stilted view that outcomes alone are the primary driver of behavior in 
economic exchange relations. As attribution theory already demonstrated that 
intentional acts are more likely to be attributed to the person performing them than 
acts that this person did not intend to make (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965), 
early findings in social psychology have shown that helping behavior is more 
likely to be reciprocated when performed voluntarily rather than forced (Goranson 
& Berkowitz, 1966; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972). Building on these insights, newer 
models of economic behavior in exchange relations have now postulated that it is 
not the outcomes themselves, but rather what these outcomes communicate about 
the intentions of the interaction partner that guides people’s behavior in these 
relations (Rabin, 1993; McCabe et al., 2003; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). McCabe 
and colleagues (2003) for example observed in a trust game that when players 
were confronted with cooperative behavior on behalf of the other player, they were 
more inclined to cooperate themselves when this behavior was performed 
voluntarily (i.e, the other also had the choice to defect, but chose to cooperate) 
rather than involuntarily (i.e., the other had no other option than a cooperative 
one).  
According to these models, actors in exchange relations will thus indeed 
base their decision to cooperate on the favorability of the outcomes they receive, 
provided that these outcomes are indicative of the other’s intentions: when an 
actor involuntarily exhibits cooperative behavior towards another agent, this agent 
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will be less inclined to cooperate than when this act was initiated voluntarily. 
These findings would suggest that the effectiveness of financial compensations 
may depend on whether the compensation is provided voluntarily or not. When a 
transgressor voluntarily compensates a victim, the compensation and its size can 
be an indicator of the degree to which the transgressor has benign intentions 
towards the victim, whereas when a transgressor did not show the intent to 
compensate him/herself but was forced by third party to do so, the size of the 
compensation is not necessarily a sign of the transgressor’s benevolence and good 
intentions. Therefore, receiving a large compensation that was imposed may not 
make a transgressor seem trustworthier than a forced small compensation.  
Interestingly, inferences about the intentions of another are also 
considered to be a core element in the formation of trust according to most 
definitions (Boon & Holmes, 1991; Mayer et al., 1995; Deutsch, 1960; Mellinger, 
1956). One of the most commonly accepted definitions, for example, 
conceptualizes trust as “a willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998). This 
definition of trust, would thus imply that people will particularly use the behavior 
of the other to base their decision to trust on, when this behavior provides an 
indication for the other’s intentions. As a result of this, trust scholars have argued 
that reparations may be more effective when introduced voluntarily rather than 
imposed externally (Nakayachi & Watabe, 2005; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). 
Extending this view to the use of financial compensations and the notion of 
calculus based trust in economic exchange relations, we would then expect that 
victims will particularly base their trust on the size of the outcomes they receive 
when these outcomes are indicative of the transgressor’s intentions (i.e. provided 
voluntarily).   
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3.2 EXPERIMENT 3.1 
 
We tested our ideas in the context of a trust game. The trust game is a 
widely used method to assess trust as cooperative behavior between two agents in 
an economic exchange relation (for a first description, see Berg et al., 1995). The 
first agent in this game, Player 1 (trustor), receives a certain amount of money and 
can send any part of this endowment to the second agent, Player 2 (trustee). The 
amount that Player 2 receives is then tripled, and Player 2 can subsequently decide 
how much of this tripled amount he sends back to Player 1. When Player 1 decides 
to trust Player 2 (and gives substantially), Player 2 can then decide to act 
trustworthy (giving a substantial amount back to Player 1) or to violate Player 1’s 
trust (return little or nothing).  
In our experiment, participants were assigned to the role of Player 1 and 
were confronted with a (preprogrammed) trustee who responded to their 
investment in an untrustworthy manner (i.e., returned nothing; for a first 
description of this paradigm, see Desmet, De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2011c). 
Following this violation of trust, a compensation was provided either voluntarily 
by the transgressor, or following an intervention by a third party that ordered the 
transgressor to pay compensation to the victim. We chose to manipulate this third 
party compensation enforcement as a one time intervention (without guarantee of 
interventions in future rounds), because this allowed us to study its effects on 
cooperation that is driven by trust, and not by the simple calculation that the 
transgressor will cooperate because otherwise he/she will be sanctioned again. 
The size of the compensation provided was manipulated over three levels, 
creating a condition in which victims received a small compensation that still 
generated unequal outcomes (return of their investment, but no compensation for 
the profit that their investment had created), a condition in which they received an 
Chapter 3 
 
                                                                                                                 
 63 
equalizing compensation (return of their investment and equal share of the 
generated profit) and a condition in which victims were awarded a large 
compensation that resulted in an unequal distribution in favor of the victim (return 
of the investment and all of the associated profits).  
 
3.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and experimental design. 146 university students (47.3 % 
male, 52.7 % female) volunteered to participate in a decision-making experiment 
that allowed them to earn money. Participants were on average 21 years old (SD = 
2.12 years) and were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions of our 2 
(voluntariness: voluntary vs. forced) x 3 (compensation size: small compensation, 
equal compensation or overcompensation) between subjects design.  
Experimental Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants 
were welcomed and seated in separate cubicles containing a computer. Participants 
were not able to see or hear each other during the entire experiment and all 
instructions were given via the computer.  
Trust game and trust violation. Instructions informed the participants 
that they would perform multiple rounds of an interaction task with another 
participant, located in another cubicle. They were told that for this task, they 
would each round receive 10 coins. Participants were informed that the more coins 
they earned, the more chance they would have in winning a lottery prize of 20 
Euros. 
All participants were assigned to the role of Player 1 and interacted with 
preprogrammed Player 2. Participants were given two options in round 1. They 
could either decide to give all of the 10 coins to Player 2 (trust) or they could 
choose to give no money to the counterpart (no trust). Participants were informed 
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that if they decided to transfer their endowment to the other, the amount would be 
tripled, after which the other had to decide how much of these 30 coins he or she 
would give back. To create an incentive for participants to trust in the first round, 
participants were also told that if they chose the latter option, they could only keep 
half of their original endowment (5 instead of 10 coins). When a participant 
decided not to invest, the experiment ended, and he/she was debriefed (16 
participants). When participants chose to invest (130 participants), they were 
informed that the amount had been tripled and were asked to wait a few moments, 
while the other participant made his/her decision. 
 After some time, participants were shown a message that for that round, 
the other person had decided to return no coins to the participant.  
Compensation manipulation. After they responded to some questions 
concerning the other’s decision, participants in the voluntary condition were 
informed that since this was the first round, an overview of the allocations was 
presented to the other, along with a one-time possibility to re-evaluate the 
distribution and give extra coins to the participant. After a short delay, participants 
received a message indicating that the other had decided to give them 10 (small 
compensation), 15 (equal compensation) or 20 coins (overcompensation) 
depending on the condition they were in.  
Participants in the forced condition were informed that since this was the 
first round, an overview of the allocations was presented to another participant in 
the session, and that this person was given a one-time possibility to evaluate the 
distribution and intervene by forcing the other to give extra coins to them. After a 
short delay, participants received a message indicating that this third person had 
decided to redistribute the coins between them and the other. In this message, they 
learned that the third person had decided that they receive 10 (small 
compensation), 15 (equal compensation) or 20 coins (overcompensation) from the 
other, depending on the condition they were in.  
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Assessment of trust behavior. Trust was measured as behavior, by letting 
the participants play a second round of the trust game. For this purpose, 
participants were again endowed with 10 coins. In contrast to round 1, in which 
they could only decide whether to invest or not, we created a continuous measure 
of trust for round 2, by letting the participants choose how many coins they would 
be willing to give to the other, and how many they would keep for themselves. 
They were also informed that any amount they decided not to transfer, would be 
theirs to keep. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
  
Manipulation checks. To verify whether our manipulation of 
voluntariness was successful, we asked participants on 7-point Likert scales to 
what degree they thought the other person provided the compensation voluntarily 
and to what degree the other had been forced to provide a compensation (reverse 
scored). Scores on these items were combined in a scale (r = .48, p < .001). This 
scale was entered as a dependent variable in a 2 x 3 ANOVA with voluntariness, 
compensation size and their interaction as predictors. This analysis only revealed a 
main effect for voluntariness, F(1,124) = 45.62, p < .001, η2 = .27, indicating that 
participants in the voluntary condition (M = 4.33, SD = 0.19)  perceived the 
compensation as more voluntary (and less forced) than participants in the forced 
condition (M = 2.52, SD = 0.19). 
Trust Behavior. A 2 x 3 ANOVA with voluntariness, compensation size 
and their interaction predicting trust behavior, revealed a main effect for 
compensation size, F(2,124) = 4.60, p < .05 , η2 = .07. Closer examination of this 
effect (post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple 
comparisons) showed that victims who received an overcompensation (M = 6.36, 
SD = 0.54) gave more to the transgressor than victims who received a small 
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compensation (M = 4.02, SD = 0.55, p < .05). However, this main effect was 
qualified by the significant predicted interaction effect, F(2,124) = 6.74, p < .05 , 
η2 = .10. To test our hypothesis that compensation size would only matter when 
the compensation was provided voluntarily, we conducted planned comparisons 
with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. The mean allocations are 
displayed in Table 3.1 and in Figure 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Mean Trust Game Allocations (and Standard Deviations) of Victims towards 
Transgressors as a Function of Voluntariness and Compensation Size for Experiment 3.1. 
 
 
 
Small Compensation Equal Compensation Overcompensation 
Voluntary 2.65 (0.80) a 5.33 (0.78) b 7.71 (0.78) c 
Forced 5.39 (0.74) b 5.00 (0.74) b 5.00 (0.76) b 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Means with different subscripts differ significantly from each other 
after post-hoc comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons). 
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Figure 1. Mean Allocation in second Round of Trust Game as a Function of 
Voluntariness and Compensation Size for Experiment 3.1. 
 
 
 
3.3 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
  
As predicted, our findings show that whether larger compensations foster 
more trust depends on whether these compensations are provided voluntarily or 
not. When offered voluntarily, compensations that overcompensate the harm done 
lead to more trust than small compensations or compensations that create equal 
outcomes. In contrast, when the transgressor was forced by a third party to provide 
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compensation, victims’ trust was not affected by the size of this compensation.  
Our findings contribute to the literature on trust repair in a number of ways. 
Below, we discuss the most important contributions.  
A first contribution is that we focused on a trust repair tactic that is quite 
prevalent in economic exchange relations, although understudied by researchers. 
Scholars in the field of trust repair so far mainly looked at the effectiveness of 
verbal accounts in restoring trust (Kim et al., 2004; Tomlinson et al., 2004; 
Schweitzer et al., 2006). It is only recently that studies have shown that in the 
context of economic exchange relations, the provision of financial compensations 
following distributive harm can too exert a positive influence in re-establishing 
trust and cooperation (Bottom et al., 2002, Desmet et al., 2011a). Furthermore, 
findings so far were mixed as to whether the size of the compensation contributes 
to its effectiveness (Bottom et al., 2002, Desmet et al., 2011a). By showing that 
voluntary overcompensation can lead to more trust than compensations that create 
equal outcomes or than small compensations, we believe to have found more 
conclusive evidence that larger compensations can indeed foster more trust than 
small compensations, provided that they are indicative of the transgressor’s intent 
(i.e., introduced voluntarily) and at least cover the victim’s loss. 
A second contribution is that we studied how the voluntariness with which 
a compensation is provided, affects trust. While trust scholars already speculated 
about the possible influence of whether reparations are undertaken voluntarily by 
the transgressor, or following coercion (Nakayachi & Watabe, 2005; Gillespie & 
Dietz, 2009), up till now, research only focused on voluntary reparations and 
empirical studies examining the effects of this voluntariness were lacking. Because 
in real-life, agents in economic exchange relations often turn to a third party to 
decide whether and what reparation is appropriate (cf. tort litigation), we deemed 
it necessary to investigate the effects of this third party intervention on victim’s 
willingness to trust and cooperate again with the transgressor. We found that this 
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intervention indeed affects victims’ behavior towards a transgressor in the sense 
that it influences how the size impacts their trust: when provided voluntarily, 
overcompensation of the harm can lead to more trust than when this compensation 
is imposed by a third party. Interestingly, the reverse was true for small 
compensations: when transgressors voluntarily decided to not let the victim share 
in the generated profit and provided compensation that only covered the victim’s 
loss, they were trusted less than when a third party imposed this small 
compensation.  
Finally, our findings also contribute to theory development of economic 
behavior in exchange relations. Whereas prior models assumed that behavior in 
these relations was merely driven by outcome-related concerns (Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), recent models have postulated that it is 
not the outcomes per se, but rather what these outcomes communicate about the 
interaction partner’s intentions that guide people’s behavior (Rabin, 1993; 
McCabe et al., 2003; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). As we showed that victims’ 
behavior in these relations is only guided by the favorability of the compensation 
they receive when these compensations reflect the other’s intent (i.e. provided 
voluntarily), our findings also lend further support for intention-based models of 
economic exchange behavior. Despite these contributions of our findings, we also 
need to point out some limitations to our work 
 
3.3.1 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
A first potential limitation lies in the fact that although we measured trust 
as behavior, we did not include measures that tap into the attributional process that 
victims who receive a financial compensation make. Although we predicted and 
found that victims would only be sensitive to the size of a compensation when this 
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compensation could be attributed to the transgressor’s intention, an interesting 
question remains in how victims who receive a forced compensation perceive the 
transgressor. Our data showed that victims in that condition displayed surprisingly 
high levels of trusting behavior towards the transgressor (they transferred half of 
their endowment on average), making that victims who received a small 
compensation were prepared to give more to a transgressor when this transgressor 
was forced to compensate than when he/she voluntarily provided this 
compensation. This seems to suggest that victims who receive a forced 
compensation assume that the transgressor has good intentions, but due to a lack 
of process data, we cannot be sure that this is actually the case.  
One possible explanation for this finding is that the third party 
intervention installed some sort of trust in the system, based on the assumption 
that future violations would again be corrected by this third party. However, this 
explanation is unlikely to explain our findings as this would also predict that 
stronger sanctions (i.e. the transgressor is forced to pay more compensation to the 
victim) would yield more trust that a transgressor will cooperate in the future than 
small sanctions. Furthermore, this explanation seems even more unlikely given the 
fact that we explicitly modeled the third party intervention as a one-time action, 
with no guarantee that this third party would be able to intervene in future rounds. 
However, although victims who received a forced compensation were told that 
there was no guarantee that this third-party could intervene in future rounds, 
participants in these conditions may have been under the impression that their 
allocations would be monitored and that therefore their allocations were not 
necessarily private. This feeling of being monitored, and their allocations being 
rather public than private, may in turn have instigated participants to conform to 
more rule-based behavior, such as adhering to the fairness rule of equality as a 
decision heuristic (Reis & Gruzen, 1976; Kramer et al., 1993; Messick, 1993; 
Stouten et al., 2005). As only participants in the forced conditions were aware of 
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this possible monitoring, this might clarify why participants who received a forced 
compensation on average transferred half of their endowment to the other in round 
2, and why a forced small compensation yielded more cooperation than a small 
voluntary compensation. As allocations in the forced condition would then 
however not necessarily reflect trust, but rather a more normative adherence to a 
distribution rule, an important avenue for future research would be to contrast this 
behavioral measure with self-reported measures of trust perceptions, in order to 
distill to what extent participants in the forced condition actually attribute good 
intent to the transgressor. 
Finally, another limitation is that we studied trust violations and the 
effects of financial compensations at an early stage of an economic exchange 
relation. As the transgression in our study happened in the first round and was 
quickly responded to with a compensation (at least in the case of a voluntary 
compensation), one might wonder whether there actually is trust that can be 
violated and whether it is then indeed trust recovery that we study and not the 
building up of initial trust. Prior research has however shown that even in first 
interactions with strangers, people display surprisingly high levels of initial trust, a 
fact which is also witnessed by the high number of participants in our sample who 
chose trust in the first round (Berg et al., 1995; Kramer, 1994; Meyerson et al., 
1996; McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998). Given these high levels of initial 
trust, it is reasonable to argue that this initial trust will also decrease when a 
transgressor does not honor this trust and decides to make an unfair allocation. As 
a matter of fact, research that used a similar paradigm to study trust repair in 
exchange relations (with a transgression in the first round, followed by 
compensation) demonstrated not only that initial trust indeed decreases following 
a violation, but also that this violated trust increases again following compensation 
(Desmet et al., 2011a). Given these findings and given that early violations of trust 
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are not only highly prevalent, but also detrimental to the further development of 
trust in exchange relations (Lount et al., 2008), we believe that examining how 
trust increases again following an early violation of trust poses an intriguing 
challenge for researchers and decision makers.  
 
3.3.2 Conclusion 
 
With this research, we hope to have shed some new light on how decision 
makers in economic exchange relations can deal effectively with the aftermath of 
unethical behavior. A common regulatory approach in response to harm in these 
relations consists of letting a third party (e.g. a supervisor, judge) decide whether 
and what reparation the transgressor needs to make. By putting victims’ trust 
towards the transgressor central, we showed that this third party intervention, 
however, comes at a price. Because compensations are no longer indicative of the 
transgressors good intentions, a transgressor making larger amends will not 
necessarily be trusted more when he/she was ordered by a third party to do so. As 
such, our findings underline that the actual value of substantive financial 
compensations in restoring trust and cooperation is not only determined by their 
financial value, but also by what they communicate about the transgressor’s 
intentions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. INTENTIONS AND REPENTANCE IN THE EYE OF THE 
BEHOLDER: THE ROLE OF TRAIT FORGIVENESS4 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Trust is indispensable when we interact with others in the social world. In 
exchange relations, characterized by interactions in which our own outcomes are 
at odds with those of others, trust is important and useful because it not only 
reduces fear of exploitation, but also fuels us to be more benevolent and prosocial 
towards our interaction partners. In a wide variety of economic game settings (e.g. 
prisoner’s and public good dilemmas), trust has been shown to foster cooperation, 
resulting in higher joint outcomes for the interacting parties (Parks et al., 1996; De 
Cremer et al., 2001). Despite these positive consequences of trust, people often 
show behavior that violates their interaction partner’s trust and thus undermines 
cooperation (Boles et al., 2000; O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997, Schweitzer et al., 
2006). 
Given the pervasive and persistent negative consequences that a breach of 
trust may trigger (Lount et al., 2008, Schweitzer et al., 2006; Bies & Tripp, 1996; 
Robinson, 1996), it is surprising that to date only few studies have devoted 
attention to the interpersonal effects of trust violations in economic decision 
making and, more importantly, to how trust can be restored again in these settings. 
While some scholars have advocated the effectiveness of verbal offender accounts 
like apologies, promises or denials (e.g., Kim et al., 2004; 2006; Tomlinson et al., 
2004), recent findings in economic exchange relations, in which a trust violation 
most often results in a monetary loss, have shown that providing a substantial 
                                                           
4 This chapter is based on Desmet, De Cremer & Van Dijk (2011c) 
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financial compensation may have a positive impact on restoring trust and 
cooperation (Desmet et al., 2011a; Bottom et al., 2002).  
Although this new body of research is compelling and paves the way for 
an integrative framework on the restoration of trust and cooperation, the studies 
conducted so far all have in common that they focus on repair strategies that are 
voluntarily initiated by the transgressor. Voluntary repair offers on behalf of a 
transgressor, however, are not that regularly observed in the aftermath of real-life 
trust violations: apologies are often explicitly demanded by victims, financial 
compensations are habitually imposed by a judge, before a court. Although forced 
compensations may be more present in daily life, from a psychological point of 
view, one might wonder whether restorative acts actually reveal the expected 
positive effects when a transgressor did not have the initial intention to perform 
them and had to be coerced into making these amends.  
Prior research has documented that one of the key determinants of 
successful restoration attempts is the perceived sincerity and remorse of the 
transgressor (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Tomlinson et al., 2004; Okimoto, 
2008). Voluntary, unforced acts of repair have the advantage that they can signal 
to the victim that the transgressor him- or herself genuinely has the intention to 
restore the relationship. Forced acts of repair, in contrast, do not necessarily reflect 
that the transgressor wishes to restore the relationship (Heider, 1958; Jones & 
Davis, 1965; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972). This suggests that voluntary acts of 
repair may be perceived as much more sincere than reparations that a transgressor 
did not intend to make. Consequently, the positive impact of acts of repair on trust 
and cooperation may be less clear-cut when such acts result from coercion by 
others than when they are initiated voluntarily by the transgressor.  
In the present research, we examined whether in the context of a trust 
game, financial compensations are more effective in restoring trust when being 
offered voluntarily relative to being enforced by a third party. From a standard 
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economic point of view, one might argue that the victims of a trust violation in an 
economic game may be concerned primarily about the final outcomes they receive 
and as such little difference should be found between the manner in which a 
financial compensation is delivered. However, adopting a personality approach, 
we develop the argument that individual decision makers may differ in the way 
they are susceptible towards the information about how the financial compensation 
is delivered. That is, in the present paper, we argue that individual differences 
exist that predict the degree to which victims take this voluntariness of the act into 
account when deciding to trust again. Specifically, we propose that victims’ 
dispositional tendency to forgive will determine to what extent the way a 
compensation was delivered will guide their trust behavior. 
 
4.1.1 Trust (repair) and the importance of perceived intentions 
 
Over the past decades, a growing number of researchers have devoted 
their attention to the study of trust in a variety of domains, sculpting a literature 
that is now vast and diverse. With this surge in research efforts, the literature has 
generated a myriad of different definitions of trust (e.g. Boon & Holmes, 1991; 
Mayer et al., 1995; Deutsch, 1960; Mellinger, 1956). Despite their abundance, 
most of these definitions recognize a similar core element as a basis of trust: an 
expectation of good intent on behalf of the interaction partner. This is best 
illustrated by the most widely accepted and cited definition of trust as “a 
willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998).  
Apart from providing us with an understanding of what trust is this notion 
of good intent can also help us to understand how violated trust might be repaired. 
In the case of a trust violation, when a victim’s positive expectations are violated, 
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the challenge for a transgressor to earn a victim’s trust again will be to revive this 
victim’s thwarted expectations of good intentions. For a restorative attempt to be 
effective then, a victim’s perceptions of the transgressor will have to be changed 
by acts that indicate at least good intent on behalf of the transgressor. But when do 
actions display good intent? 
In economic exchange settings, where financial outcomes are divided 
between different parties, an important restorative act in response to distributive 
harm is to provide a financial compensation to the victim. Indeed, trust in these 
relations has been shown to be driven particularly by outcome-related concerns 
(cf. calculus-based trust, Lewicki et al., 2005; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). As such, 
we could expect that receiving compensation for a monetary loss would be a 
sufficient response for victims of distributive harm. However, research in 
exchange relations has shown that actors’ behaviour in these settings is not only 
driven by outcome-related concerns, but also by other, less tangible concerns, such 
as communicated intent (McCabe et al., 2003; Falk et al., 2008). Following this, 
we could expect financial compensations to be particularly effective in restoring 
trust and cooperation if they also communicate true repentance and renewed good 
intentions. Therefore, whether compensations are given voluntarily or following 
coercion by a third party may make a substantial difference in a victim’s 
perception of a transgressor’s repentance and good intent, and subsequently, his or 
her trust in the transgressor. 
Research into other repair mechanisms (e.g. apologies) has shown that a 
key determinant of successful reparations is the perceived repentance they 
communicate: reparations are more effective when perceived as sincere and 
remorseful (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Exline & Baumeister, 2000; Gold & 
Weiner, 2000; De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Tomlinson et al., 2004; Ohtsubo & 
Watanabe 2009). Okimoto (2008) recently observed that this might also be the 
case for financial compensations. He found that following procedural injustice, 
Chapter 4 
 
                                                                                                                 
 77 
providing compensation to the victim is particularly effective if the compensation 
is construed as a benevolent gesture communicating remorse (Okimoto, 2008). 
An important factor that influences the extent to which a transgressor is 
perceived as repenting, is whether the act is initiated voluntarily or following 
coercion. Voluntary reparations may be more effective in restoring trust as they 
are more likely to be seen as being sincere and signaling true remorse than 
responses that an offender was forced to make (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). This 
idea is consistent with early attribution theory that suggests that intentional acts 
are more likely to be attributed to the person himself than acts that an individual 
did not intend to make (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965). Thus, voluntary 
actions are likely to be more diagnostic for the transgressor’s true intentions and 
commitment than responses that are imposed.  
We would therefore expect that in the context of economic exchange, 
financial compensations show more repentance when provided voluntarily as 
opposed to forced. Following this reasoning, we could also expect voluntary 
compensations to foster more trust. Having said this, we can, however, wonder 
whether a signal of repentance is always a necessary precursor for victims to act 
on in the process of trust repair. As mentioned earlier, from a standard economic 
point of view, it could also be reasoned that the victim of a trust violation 
primarily cares about the final outcomes he or she receives himself/herself. The 
way the compensation is delivered may then matter less. However, as argued 
above, psychologically speaking an outcome never comes alone: a trust repair act 
(i.e. providing a compensation) always conveys additional information about why 
it is delivered. Adopting this psychological perspective, we reason that some 
individual decision makers can be more susceptible towards the manner in which a 
financial compensation is delivered than others. In other words, we argue that 
whereas voluntary compensations will indeed communicate more repentance to 
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victims, not all people will be equally affected by this repentance in their decision 
to trust again. That is, while for some people seeing a transgressor repent may be a 
prerequisite to trust and showing behavioral goodwill, others may find a 
transgressor’s repentance less vital to their willingness to be vulnerable again. We 
propose that individual differences in people’s tendency to forgive will influence 
the impact of the voluntariness of financial compensations on victims’ trust.  
 
4.1.2 Trait Forgiveness as a moderator 
 
Whereas for years, the study of forgiveness seemed a focal point reserved 
for theologists and moral philosophers (Adams, 1991; Jones, 1995; Griswold, 
2007), in the last decades psychologists too have started to devote empirical 
attention to the subject of forgiveness (Exline et al., 2003). A commonly accepted 
view on forgiveness is that it involves moving away from a negative state or 
motivation to a more positive one. Enright and the Human Development Study 
Group (1991) for example, describe forgiveness as volitionally abandoning 
resentment and indifferent behavior while at the same time fostering compassion 
and generosity towards the transgressor. Likewise, McCullough (2001) argues that 
when people forgive, they become less motivated to harm the offender and more 
motivated to act in ways that benefit the transgressor or their relationship with the 
transgressor; McCullough (2001) therefore defined forgiveness as a more general 
prosocial change in motivation.  
It has been argued that although forgiveness can foster reconciliation (see 
e.g. Worthington 2006), forgiveness is fundamentally distinct from reconciliation 
(Fincham 2000; Brown, 2003). Reconciliation is a bilateral process that requires 
goodwill by both partners, whereas forgiveness can be given by victims regardless 
of an offender’s intentions and actions (Fincham 2000). Forgiveness can therefore 
be seen as an unconditional, volitional response to another person: victims who 
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choose to forgive may do this unconditionally, without regard for the offender’s 
current attitudes and behavior (Enright, Freedman, & Rique, 1998).  
Importantly, studies have now revealed that stable individual differences 
exist in people’s tendency to forgive others (Berry et al., 2001; Brown, 2003; 
Brown & Phillips, 2005). As such, this may have implications for whether victims 
are more or less conditional in their decision to forgive a particular transgression: 
not all victims will equally take into account situational aspects of the violation or 
the offender’s actions. This idea is for example nicely reflected in the findings of 
Brown & Phillips (2005), which seem to suggest that people with a high tendency 
to forgive are less guided by the severity of the offense when granting forgiveness 
than people with a low tendency to forgive, who discriminate more strongly 
between severe and less severe offenses.  
In a similar vein, we hypothesize that when it comes to deciding to make 
oneself vulnerable again (i.e. trust), people with a high tendency to forgive will be 
less influenced by whether an offender repents or not. Whereas for people with a 
low tendency to forgive, seeing a transgressor repent or not can have an important 
impact on their subsequent behavior, victims who are high in trait forgiveness will 
consider it less of a prerequisite that a transgressor is repenting. Therefore, we 
expect that victims with a high tendency to forgive will be less influenced by 
whether a financial compensation was given voluntarily or following coercion in 
their decision to trust again. 
 
4.2 EXPERIMENT 4.1 
 
In Experiment 4.1, we will investigate whether the extent to which a 
financial compensation is provided voluntarily impacts trust. We expect that 
compensations provided voluntarily will always make a transgressor seen as more 
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repentant than compensations that were forced. We further predict that not all 
people will base their decision to trust again on the perceived repentance of the 
transgressor. In fact, we propose that individual differences in victims’ tendency to 
forgive (TTF, Brown, 2003) will determine the degree to which victims 
differentiate between a compensation that was either forced or voluntary, in their 
decision to trust again.  
We addressed these questions using the trust game paradigm. The trust 
game, originally designed by Berg et al (1995), is a widely used experimental 
method that allows to measure trust as investment decisions in the setting of an 
economic exchange relation. The first agent in this game, Player 1 (trustor), 
receives a certain amount of money and can send any part of this endowment to 
the second agent, Player 2 (trustee). The amount that Player 2 receives is then 
tripled, and Player 2 can subsequently decide how much of this tripled amount he 
sends back to Player 1. When Player 1 decides to trust Player 2 (and gives 
substantially), Player 2 can then decide to act trustworthily (giving a substantial 
amount back to Player 1) or to violate Player 1’s trust (e.g. return little or nothing). 
Apart from measuring trust as cooperative behaviour, we also included self-
reported measures of trust. 
 
4.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and experimental design. 72 university students 
volunteered to participate in a “decision-making experiment” that allowed them to 
earn money. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two between 
subjects conditions (forced or voluntary compensation).  
Experimental procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants 
were seated in a cubicle and told that they would perform several smaller, 
unrelated tasks consisting of questionnaires, a colour perception experiment (i.e. a 
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filler task) and an interaction task with another participant in another cubicle.  
Participants were informed that whereas all instructions were given via the 
computer, the actual interaction (money transfers), would take place with the 
experimenter functioning as a go-between between the interacting parties. 
Participants were not able to see or hear each other during the entire experiment. 
Finally, all participants were given a pencil, answer sheets and an envelope 
containing 10 coins of 0,20 € (2 euros).  
Assessment of trait forgiveness. Embedded in other, unrelated 
questionnaires in the beginning of the experimental session, dispositional 
forgiveness was measured using the Tendency to Forgive scale (TTF; Brown, 
2003). Items on the TTF ask individuals to indicate how they usually respond 
when someone commits a transgression against them (e.g., “I tend to get over it 
quickly when someone hurts my feelings”). Participants answered on 7-point 
Likert scales, where 1 = disagree strongly and 7 = agree strongly. The TTF has 
been shown to have acceptable internal reliability, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging 
from .73 to .75 (Brown, 2003, 2004; Brown and Phillips, 2005). Cronbach’s alpha 
in the present study was .77. After filling out the questionnaires, participants 
completed a distractive colour perception task (+/- 10 minutes). 
Trust game and trust violation. Next, participants engaged in a trust 
game with actual financial outcomes at stake. Not only did participants receive 
and distribute actual money in envelopes, they were also paid according to their 
decisions in the game. Participants believed that they would play multiple rounds 
of an interaction task. They were told that for this task they would need the 
envelope containing the 10 coins. All participants were assigned to the role of 
Player 1 and interacted with a confederate Player 2. Participants were given two 
options in round 1. They could either decide to give all of the 10 coins to Player 2 
(trust) or they could choose to give no money to the counterpart (no trust). 
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Participants were informed that if they decided to transfer their endowment to the 
other, the amount would be tripled by the experimenter, after which the other had 
to decide how much of these 30 coins he or she would give back. To create an 
incentive for participants to trust in the first round, participants were told that if 
they chose the latter option, they could only keep half of their original endowment 
(1 instead of 2€).  
After participants made their decision, the experimenter came by to collect 
the answer sheets and envelope. When a participant decided not to invest, the 
experiment ended, he/she was debriefed and paid 1€ for their participation (7 
participants). When participants chose to invest (65 participants), the experimenter 
ostensibly tripled the amount and told the participants to wait for some time, while 
the other participant made his/her decision. After a few minutes, the experimenter 
re-entered the participant’s cubicle and gave participants an envelope containing a 
filled out form, indicating that for that round, the other person had decided to 
return nothing to the participant.  
Compensation type manipulation (voluntary or forced). After 
participants responded to some questions concerning the other’s decision, the 
experimenter re-entered the cubicle with the message that the other person had 
been given the one-time opportunity to reconsider his offer and maybe give some 
extra coins to them. In the voluntary condition, participants were told the 
following:  “When we explained this opportunity, the other person voluntarily 
offered to give you something more because - as he stated - the two of you still 
have to interact for a long remainder of rounds.” Participants in the forced 
condition were told: “After we explained this opportunity, the other person did not 
express willingness to do this. However, because the two of you still have to 
interact for a long remainder of rounds, we pressured him into giving you 
something more.’ After participants received one of these messages, they were 
given an envelope containing 15 coins.  
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Assessment of trust behaviour. A behavioural measure of trust was taken 
by letting the participants play a second round of the trust game. For this purpose, 
participants received another 10 coins of 0,20 € (2 euros). In contrast to round 1, in 
which they could only decide whether to invest or not, we created a continuous 
measure of trust for round 2, by letting the participants choose how many coins 
they would be willing to give to Player 2, and how many they would keep for 
themselves. They were also informed that any amount they decided not to transfer, 
would be theirs to keep. 
Self-reported trust. Apart from this behavioural measure, we also 
measured self-reported trust. After a financial compensation was provided, 
participants answered 6 questions, assessing trustworthiness perceptions and trust 
(7-point Likert scales, based on De Cremer, 2004; Mayer et al. 1995, the 
benevolence scale; 1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). Exemplary items were: “To 
what degree do you think you can trust this person?” or “do you think this person 
will be trustworthy?”. These scores were combined into a general measure of trust 
towards the other (Cronbach’s α = .93). 
Perceived repentance. After receiving a financial compensation, we also 
asked participants to what degree they perceived the other person as repentant (7-
point Likert scale, 1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). 
 
4.2.2 Results 
 
Manipulation checks. To verify whether our compensation type 
manipulation was successful, we asked participants on 7-point Likert scales to 
what degree they thought the other person provided the compensation voluntarily 
and to what degree the other had been forced to provide a compensation (reverse 
scored). After rescaling the latter item, scores on both items were summed up and 
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divided by two to create a scale (r = .384, p < .005). This scale was entered as 
dependent variable in a General Linear Model with both our manipulated variable 
(compensation type, 2 levels), standardized TTF scores (continuous) and their 
interaction as predictors. This analysis only revealed a main effect for 
compensation type, F(1,61) = 25.89, p < .001 , η2 = .30, indicating that participants 
in the voluntary condition (M = 3.97, SD = 0.23)  perceived the compensation 
more as more voluntary (and less forced) than participants in the forced condition 
(M = 2.32, SD = 0.23). 
Perceived repentance. A General Linear Model with compensation type, 
TTF and their interaction predicting the perceived repentance of the transgressor, 
revealed only a main effect of compensation type, F(1,61) = 5.92, p < .05 , η2 = 
.09, indicating that transgressors who compensated voluntarily (M = 4.27, SD = 
0.30) were perceived as more repentant than transgressors who were forced to 
compensate (M = 3.23, SD = 0.31). 
Self-reported trust. A General Linear Model with compensation type, 
TTF and their interaction predicting self-reported trust, revealed a main effect for 
compensation type, F(1,61) = 4.20, p < .05 , η2 = .06: victims reported more trust 
towards a transgressor that compensated voluntarily (M = 3.94, SD = 0.22), as 
compared to a transgressor that was forced to compensate (M = 3.30, SD = 0.22). 
Furthermore, a significant main effect for tendency to forgive, F(1,61) = 6.91, p < 
.05 , η2 = .10, indicated that people with a high tendency to forgive showed more 
trust than victims with a low tendency to forgive, b = .78  t(62) = 3.71, p < .001. 
These main effects were however qualified by the predicted interaction effect, 
F(1,61) = 5.37, p < .05 , η2 = .08: while people with a low tendency to forgive 
discriminated strongly between a voluntary or a forced compensation, b = 1.37  
t(62) = 3.09, p < .005,  people with a high tendency to forgive did not, b = -.09  
t(62) = -.211, ns. These results are displayed in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Self reported trust as a function of compensation type and TTF scores. 
Low and high values on the TTF scale were calculated at ±1 SD. 
 
 
 
Trust behaviour. The same analysis as for self-reported trust, with now 
trust behaviour as dependent variable, revealed the same predicted interaction 
effect, F(1,61) = 6.74, p < .05 , η2 = .10. People with a low tendency to forgive 
discriminated strongly between a voluntary or a forced compensation, b = 2.94 
t(62) = 2.46, p < .05.  Victims with a high tendency to forgive were not affected by 
compensation type and gave someone who was forced to compensate just as much 
as someone who voluntarily offered compensation, b = -1.47 t(62) = 1.24, ns. 
These results are displayed in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Trust game allocation of victims towards the transgressors as a function 
of compensation type and TTF scores. Low and high values on the TTF scale were 
calculated at ±1 SD.  
 
 
 
Moderated mediation analyses (perceived repentance). While the main 
effect of compensation type on repentance showed that victims perceive a 
transgressor compensating voluntarily as more repenting than a transgressor who 
was forced to compensate, the forgiveness x compensation type interaction on 
trust behavior indicates that when it comes to showing trust, only low forgivers 
seem to discount for perceived repentance in their decision to trust. 
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Therefore, we tested a conditional mediation model in which forgiveness 
moderates the indirect effect of compensation type on trust behaviour through 
perceived repentance. Specifically, we estimated whether repentance mediates the 
effect of compensation type on trust behavior more among low forgivers, than for 
high forgivers. We therefore conducted an additional regression analysis (see 
Baron & Kenny, 1986) including all previously described independent variables 
and investments in the second round as dependent variable. In the final step, 
repentance was added as an additional predictor. This analysis showed that the 
forgiveness x repentance interaction indeed significantly affected investments, 
F(1,57)= 3.77, p = .05, η2 = .06. Moreover, entering repentance rendered the 
interactive effect of tendency to forgive and compensation type on investments 
nonsignificant, F(1,57) = .31, ns.  
To formally test this moderated mediation (see Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 
2005), we proceeded by using a bootstrap method, developed by Preacher, Rucker 
& Hayes (2007). In accordance with our predictions, forgiveness was treated as a 
moderator of the path from repentance (the mediator) to trust behaviour (the 
dependant variable), and not as a moderator of the path from compensation type 
(the independent variable) to repentance (the mediator). Our effect estimates are 
based on 10000 bootstrap samples. The analysis supported our hypothesis: the 
indirect effect of compensation type on trust behavior, via repentance, was 
significantly larger than 0 for low forgivers (z = -1.83, p < .05), but not for high 
forgivers (z = 1.49, ns). The results of these mediation analyses are illustrated in 
Fig. 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3: Path diagram of the role of perceived repentance in mediating the impact 
of compensation type on trust behavior, as a function of tendency to forgive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Taken together, the present findings supported our hypotheses. Whereas 
receiving a voluntary compensation communicates more repentance to victims 
than when this compensation was imposed, particularly people with a low 
tendency to forgive discount this repentance in their decision to trust again. 
Moreover, for victims with a high tendency to forgive, perceived offender 
repentance matters less in their willingness to be vulnerable again. The present 
findings contribute significantly to the growing literature on trust repair in 
economic exchange relations in several ways. 
 A first contribution lies in the fact that we investigated the influence of 
compensations as a function of whether they were imposed by a third party or 
offered voluntarily. Prior research only focused on repair strategies that were 
voluntarily initiated, whereas in real life, financial compensations are often 
b = .59*  Low forgivers: b = 1.95*  
High forgivers: b = .03 
 
Compensation 
type 
Perceived 
repentance 
Trust behavior 
Tendency to 
forgive 
Low forgivers: b = 1.10 (2.94*)  
High forgivers: b = -.12 (-1.47) 
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obtained through a third party that obliges an offender to pay compensation to the 
victim (cf. litigation). By showing that the voluntariness of the act unveils 
information pertaining to a transgressor’s perceived repentance, which in turn can 
influence a victim’s future cooperation, we believe to have identified a new and 
important factor contributing to the effectiveness of restorative actions in 
economic exchanges.   
 A second contribution is that we examined trust repair by looking at the 
influence of victim characteristics at the personality level. While previous research 
evaluated trust repair in terms of characteristics of the transgression, offender 
tactics, or relationship characteristics, we proposed and found that individual 
differences in victims’ tendency to forgive determine the degree to which 
perceived repentance functions as a prerequisite for trust and cooperation. This 
finding is particularly important as it contrasts with standard economic theories 
that would argue that victims of trust violations in economic exchanges should not 
be concerned about how a financial compensation is delivered, as the primary 
concern should be with how much one eventually ends up with. The fact that 
people clearly differ in whether they take into account how voluntarily a 
compensation procedure is shaped, indicates that not all individuals adopt a 
rational perspective in which outcomes are the primary driver of one’s judgments 
and behaviors. As such, in line with the theme of the present special issue, our 
findings strongly underscore the importance of adopting a personality (i.e. 
tendency to forgive) x situation (i.e. compensation type) perspective when 
examining decision behavior in trust games. 
 A third contribution is that we unveiled the process through which the 
voluntariness of the restorative act impacts subsequent behavior, that is, through 
perceived offender repentance. Our moderated mediation analyses showed that 
while voluntary (as opposed to forced) compensations always communicate more 
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repentance (regardless of victims’ tendency to forgive), low forgivers will be more 
inclined to base their trust judgment and behavior on this perceived repentance 
than high forgivers. Although victims who are more prone to forgive do not miss 
out on situational cues that unveil important information about a transgressor’s 
current attitude and intentions towards him or her (repentance), they choose to be 
vulnerable again and do so less conditionally. These results thus also corroborate 
previous ideas findings that forgivers are more inclined to forgive unconditionally 
(Fincham 2000; Brown & Phillips, 2005). However, we also need to point out that 
our findings do not allow us to conclude that high forgivers will always be more 
prone to forgive, regardless of the offender’s reparative actions. As we did not 
include a condition in which no compensation was offered, it is difficult to say 
whether victims with a high tendency to forgive will continue to trust even when 
no compensation is provided by the transgressor. It would be worthwhile for future 
research to shed light on this issue and investigate to what degree this 
unconditional forgiving would uphold when a transgressor decides not to 
undertake reparative actions or, even worse, displays even more negative 
reactions, such as malicious pleasure or victim blaming.  
  In light of the above, our findings also contribute to the literature on 
forgiveness. Only recently, stable individual differences have been identified in 
people’s general tendency to forgive (Berry et al. 2001; Brown, 2003). As a result, 
research so far was dedicated either to linking forgiveness to other dispositional 
variables (see Berry et al. 2001; Brown, 2003) or to validating its ability to predict 
forgiveness in specific situations (Brown & Phillips, 2005; Koutsos, Wetheim, & 
Kornblum, 2008). However, prior research has largely ignored how this tendency 
to forgive might interact with the way contextual factors are processed in the 
course of restoration attempts. By demonstrating that trait forgiveness determines 
whether a victim reacts more favorably towards voluntary acts as opposed to 
forced acts, and by uncovering the process through which this occurs (perceived 
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repentance), we believe to have made a broader contribution to this literature, by 
exposing an empirical link between this relatively new developed trait, a 
situational factor, and real-life behavior.  
 In conclusion, our findings on the influence of dispositional forgiveness 
illustrate the value of taking a broader, interactionist perspective on studying 
economic decision making. We investigated the ways that attributes of persons 
(e.g. their tendency to forgive) and features of their situations (e.g. the 
voluntariness of the restorative act and the repentance it communicates) are 
integrated by individuals as they construct and pursue agendas for economic 
action. As such, an overall recommendation for future research on economic 
decision-making is to focus more strongly on the interactive effect of 
psychological states, predispositions and situational cues when predicting 
judgments and behavior.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
WHEN COMPENSATION IS NOT ENOUGH: RESTORING TRUST 
IN INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In our daily lives and work relations, we frequently interact with 
individuals or social collectives on whom we depend for receiving tangible 
outcomes. Given that these relations are characterized by the exchange of 
resources that have economic value, these relations are typically referred to as 
economic exchange relations. In such settings, trust has proven to play a pivotal 
role in creating and preserving cooperative behavior (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Parks 
et al., 1996; Komorita, Sheposh, & Braver, 1968; De Cremer et al., 2001). 
Notwithstanding this importance of trust, actors in these relations nevertheless are 
often seen slipping into defection, hence risking trust to be eroded and cooperation 
to be endangered (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998). Despite the abundant empirical 
work on the benefits of trust in economic exchange relations, scholars have 
remained relatively silent on how violated trust might be repaired in these 
relations. As a result, an important challenge for actors in economic exchange 
relations these days remains in examining how violated trust might be restored. 
Although a general consensus exist on the definition of trust as “a 
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 
1998 p. 395), scholars also agree that trust is shaped by different concerns 
depending on the type of relation one is involved in (Rouseau et al., 1998; 
Sheppard & Sherman, 1998; Lewicki et al., 1998). Trust in economic exchange 
relations, for example, has been described as being more calculus-based as 
Trust Repair and the Psychology of Financial Compensations 
 
 94 
opposed to identification-based. Rather than being driven by an identification with 
the interaction partner’s desires and motives, trust in these relations is seen as a 
more market-oriented, economic calculation where actors decide to trust based on 
the expectancy of receiving a specific, tangible benefit (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 
1996; Lewicki et al., 2005). As a result, it has been argued that particularly the 
outcomes that one receives serve as indicators of trustworthiness and as the basis 
for trust in these relations.  
Based on this view, Desmet and colleagues (2011a) hypothesized that 
when one party in these relations violates another party’s trust by inflicting 
distributive harm to the other, addressing this harm and the victim’s outcome 
related concerns by providing a compensation should have a positive impact on 
victim’s trust towards the transgressor.  Across several experiments these authors 
saw their hypotheses confirmed and observed that substantial financial 
compensation of the harm can increase victims’ trust towards the transgressor 
again. Likewise, Bottom and colleagues (2002) argued that as violations in the 
context of economic exchange relations often entail a financial loss for the victim, 
victims might view the provision of an apology alone as cheap talk and that 
therefore the transgressor needs to substantiate an apology with a financial 
compensation. Although their results confirmed this theorizing to the extent that 
apologies accompanied by compensation were more effective than apologies 
alone, interestingly, these authors also observed that even when no compensation 
was provided, the provision of an apology alone was also effective to some extent. 
These findings thus seem to suggest that a victim’s decision to trust again might 
not only be determined by the degree to which instrumental, outcome-related 
concerns are addressed (by means of a financial compensation) but also by 
whether or not relational concerns are addressed (by means of an apology).  
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5.1.1 Apologies and relational concerns 
 
Despite the importance of outcomes in shaping trust in economic 
exchange relations, research has also shown that even in these exchange contexts 
like in negotiations or public good dilemmas, not only instrumental, financial 
motives are of value, but also more subjective, relational concerns play an 
important role (Curhan et al., 2006; De Cremer, 2002). In the justice literature as 
well it has been postulated that people in exchange relations not only have concern 
for the outcomes they receive (i.e. distributive justice), but also for relational 
aspects, such as the way these outcomes are obtained, their status in the relation 
and the degree to which they are treated with respect (i.e. procedural and 
interactional justice, Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Bies, 
1990). As a result, a trust violation in economic exchange relations may not only 
affect a victim’s concern for distributive aspects of the violation, but also for 
relational aspects. One way in which a transgressor can also address these 
relational concerns in the restoration process is by providing an apology along 
with a financial compensation. However, research in economic exchange relations 
has not yet answered the question whether addressing relational concerns by 
means of an apology actually restores trust further if the transgressor already 
provides a financial compensation.  
Just as a violation puts a victim in an inferior position towards the 
transgressor, apologies have the purpose to lower the status of the transgressor and 
to restore the social harmony (Hareli & Eisikovits, 2006). Because transgressors 
who apologize symbolically subordinate their status in the relation through the 
expression of remorse and the admission of responsibility, scholars have identified 
the apology as a suitable candidate for expressing relational concern to the victim 
(Okimoto & Tyler, 2007). Okimoto and Tyler (2007) investigated whether 
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expressing relational concerns in addition to providing a financial compensation 
can be more effective than providing compensation alone. The authors observed 
this was indeed the case: across four studies they found that victims of distributive 
harm reacted more favorable towards a compensation if it was accompanied by 
relational concern (Okimoto & Tyler, 2007).  
 
5.1.2 When financial compensations need apologies: it depends on the 
interaction partner.  
 
The findings above would suggest that victims of distributive harm might 
respond more favorable when a transgressor not only provides compensation, but 
also expresses relational concern through the provision of an apology. However, 
important to note is that in the studies of Okimoto and Tyler (2007), the decisions 
to provide compensation and to express relational concern or not, were made by a 
collective entity (a group) rather than by an individual. Importantly, actors in an 
exchange relation who receive relational concern from a group might value this 
concern more than actors who receive relational concern from a sole individual.  
When an individual no longer interacts with a single person but with a 
group of people who have to make joint decisions, the structure of the relation 
changes dramatically, as the outcomes of the individual now no longer depend on 
the decisions of one person, but of more people. If an individual’s outcomes 
depend on more people, the individual may experience more uncertainty about 
whether his/her trust will be honored and about whether he/she will receive the 
desired outcomes (Kerr, 1989; Sato, 1988; Sniezek, May, & Sawyer, 1990). 
Furthermore, an individual interacting with a group may also have poor insight in 
the dynamics that guide the group’s decisions, even when he/she eventually 
receives a favorable outcome. Given this higher social uncertainty, it seems 
plausible that individuals in such situations will more actively seek and use social 
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cues in their decision to trust a group. In fact, a recent review has shown that the 
more people one’s outcomes depend on, the more weight an individual places on 
communication with those others when deciding to cooperate or not (Balliet, 
2010).  
Given this increased uncertainty when interacting with groups, scholars 
have argued that people who interact with a group are also likely to be more 
sensitive to the expression of relational concern (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). As 
particularly apologies can address relational concerns following a violation 
(Okimoto & Tyler, 2007), one could therefore expect victims of a trust violation 
who are interacting with a group (rather than with an individual) to be more 
sensitive to whether or not apologies are provided as part of the restoration. 
Indirect support for this expectation comes from recent research that showed that 
people indeed value different elements of a reparation depending on whether they 
see themselves more as an individual that depends on a larger group than when 
they see themselves as less dependent of others.  Fehr and Gelfand (2010) for 
example observed that whereas victims with a dominant relational or collective 
self were more forgiving towards restorations that conveyed the basic components 
of an apology (empathy or an admission of violated norms, respectively), victims 
with a less dependent self-construal were more influenced by whether or not 
compensation was provided for the violation. In line with this, we believe that 
particularly when people are interacting with a group of people rather than with an 
individual, will the provision of an apology in addition to a financial compensation 
have an added positive effect on trust (as compared to a compensation alone). 
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5.1.3 The present research 
 
In the present research, we examined in the context of an economic 
exchange relation whether the provision of a financial compensation and an 
apology by the transgressor can restore victims’ trust more than when the 
transgressor solely provides a (quiet) compensation. We suggest that apologies can 
indeed exert an additional effect on trust, but hypothesize that this effect will 
particularly emerge when a victim is interacting with a group rather than with an 
individual. 
The paradigm we used in our studies was rooted in the 'trust game', 
originally designed by Berg et al (1995). The trust game in its most basic form 
measures trust between two agents as investment decisions in an economic 
exchange context. The first agent in this game, the trustor, receives a certain 
amount of money and can send any part of this endowment to the second agent, 
the trustee. The amount that the trustee receives is then tripled, and the trustee can 
then decide how much of this tripled amount he sends back to the trustor. When a 
trustor decides to trust the trustee (and gives substantially), the trustee can then 
choose to act trustworthy and give a substantial amount back to the trustor or to 
violate the trustor’s trust and return little or nothing.  
 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 5.1 
 
5.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and experimental design. 97 Dutch university students 
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of our 2 (Interaction partner: 
individual vs. group) x 2 (Restoration type: compensation vs. compensation and 
apology) between subjects design. All participants volunteered in a 'decision-
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making assignment' in return for course credits and the possibility of earning some 
money.  
Procedure. When participants arrived at the laboratory, they were 
welcomed and placed in separate cubicles containing a computer, a chair and a 
table. Depending on the condition they were assigned to, participants were then 
told they would interact with either one participant or a group of two participants 
who had to coordinate their decisions. Participants were also informed that 
whereas all instructions were given via the computer, the actual interaction 
(transfer of tickets), would take place with the experimenter functioning as a go-
between between the interacting parties. Participants were not able to see or hear 
each other during the entire experiment. Finally, all participants were given a 
pencil, some answer sheets and an envelop containing 10 lottery tickets. 
Trust game and trust violation. Next, all participants were assigned to 
the role of trustor and engaged in a trust game with confederate trustees. 
Instructions informed the participants that they would play multiple rounds of an 
interaction task (either with a group or a an individual). They were told that for 
this interaction task they would need the envelope containing the 10 tickets. After 
this, the rules of the trust game were explained more in detail. Participants were 
instructed that each round, he or she would receive 10 tickets and that they had 
two options in round 1. They could either decide to give all of the 10 tickets to the 
other party (trust) or they could choose to give no tickets at all (no trust). 
Participants were informed that if they decided to transfer their tickets to the other 
party, the number of tickets would be tripled by the experimenter, after which the 
other party had to decide how much of these 30 tickets it would give back. To 
create an incentive for participants to trust in the first round, participants were told 
that if they chose the latter option, they could only keep half of their original 
endowment (5 instead of 10 tickets).  
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Participants who interacted with a group were furthermore also notified 
that, only at the end of the interaction task, both group members would each 
receive the number of tickets that the group had earned together (i.e., group 
members did not have to split the number of tickets earned). We included this 
crucial instruction (and a check assessing whether they correctly understood this 
instruction) in order to prevent participants from assuming that group members in 
the end would only receive part of what the group had earned and therefore would 
be more entitled to or have a stronger preference throughout the experiment for 
unequal outcomes in favor of the group.  
After participants indicated that they had made their decision, the 
experimenter came by to collect the answer sheets and envelope. When a 
participant decided not to invest, the experiment directly ended and he/she was 
debriefed and paid 1€ for their participation. In the current sample, 5 participants 
indicated that they chose not to give any money to the other party. For participants 
who chose to invest (n = 92), the experimenter ostensibly tripled the tickets and 
told the participants to wait for some time, while the other party made a decision. 
After a few minutes, the experimenter re-entered the participant’s cubicle and 
handed out a form filled out by hand, indicating that for that round, the other party 
had decided to return no tickets to the participant. 
 Restoration Manipulation. After participants responded to some 
questions concerning the allocations for round 1, the experimenter re-entered the 
room with another envelope and explained to the participants that “Since this was 
the first round of the game, the other party had been given the opportunity to 
reconsider his/her/their allocation and was given the option to give them extra 
tickets”. In the compensation only condition, they received an answer sheet which 
indicated that the other(s) had decided to give something back, after which the 
number of tickets (15) was specified in hand-writing. In the compensation and 
apology conditions, this answer sheet also contained a hand-written apology. This 
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apology included a statement of apologetic intent with an admission of 
responsibility and an expression of remorse showing that the other party 
acknowledged the violation as a transgression and felt bad about it. Participants in 
the individual setting therefore received the following apology: “I’m sorry I didn’t 
give you any tickets, that wasn’t nice of me”. Similar, in the group condition, 
participants read: “We’re sorry we didn’t give you any tickets, that wasn’t nice of 
us”. 
After this statement,  
Trust behavior. The dependent variable in Experiment 5.1 was victims’ 
trust behavior in the second round of the trust game. For this purpose, after the 
provision of the compensation (with or without apology), participants were again 
endowed with 10 lottery tickets and played a second round of the trust game. In 
this second round, participants could choose to send any number of tickets 
between 0 and 10, providing us with a continuous measure of their willingness to 
trust again. Participants were also informed that any tickets they decided not to 
transfer would be theirs to keep.  
 
5.2.2 Results  
  
Manipulation checks.  To test whether our apology manipulation was 
successful we asked participants in these particular conditions to indicate whether 
the other party had also send them a message and asked them to type in what the 
other(s) had written. All participants correctly copied the apology they received, 
indicating that our manipulation was successful. 
 Trust behavior.  A 2 (Interaction partner: individual vs. group) x 2 
(Restoration type: compensation vs. compensation and apology) between subjects 
ANOVA on the amount of tickets participants were willing to invest in the second 
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round of the trust game, only revealed our predicted interaction effect, F(1,88) = 
8.04, p < .01, η2 = .08. The mean allocations are displayed in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1: Mean allocation in round 2 as a function of Restoration Type and Interaction 
Partner for Experiment 5.1. 
 
 
 
Compensation Compensation and Apology 
Individual 6.57 (0.67) a 5.57 (0.67) a 
Group 4.29 (0.66) a 7.09 (0.69) b 
Note: Higher ratings indicate higher levels of trust restoration. Standard deviations are within parentheses. Means 
with different subscripts per row differ significantly from each other after pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni 
adjusted). 
 
Closer examination of the interaction effect (pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons) revealed that whereas for victims 
interacting with a group, receiving an apology in addition to a compensation did 
result in more trust, F(1,88) = 8.72, p < .01, η2 = .09, for victims who were 
interacting with an individual, receiving an apology did not have an additional 
effect on trust compared to the sole provision of a compensation, F(1,88) = 1.11, 
ns. and illustrated by Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1. Mean Allocation in second Round of Trust Game as a Function of Restoration Type 
and Interaction Partner for Experiment 5.1. 
 
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
 
As expected, the results of Experiment 5.1 confirmed our hypothesis that 
receiving an apology in addition to a compensation can have an additional positive 
effect on trust, but particularly when people are interacting with a group rather 
than with an individual. Although these findings were consistent with our 
theorizing, we conducted a second experiment for several reasons.   
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A first reason to conduct a follow-up study was that the apology used in 
experiment 5.1 did not include a promise. While some researchers have argued 
that apologies do not necessarily need to contain a promise (Bies, 1987; 
Schweitzer et al., 2006), other scholars have claimed that for apologies to be 
complete, they need to include an explicit promise of future trustworthy behavior 
(Goffman, 1971; Schlenker, 1980). Therefore, for the sake of completeness, in 
Experiment 5.2 we used a more elaborate apology that also contained a promise of 
future trustworthy behavior. 
Furthermore, in Experiment 5.1, trust was only measured as investment 
decisions in a second round of trust game. Although this behavioral measure is a 
widely accepted method to assess trust between agents in economic exchange 
relations (see, e.g. Eckel & Wilson, 2004), there still remains a possibility that it is 
not necessarily trust alone that guides people’s behavior in this game. Therefore, 
we also included self-reported measures of trust in Experiment 5.2, to ensure that 
it is actual trust that underlies our observed effects.  
Finally, Experiment 5.1 was played by exchanging envelopes containing lottery 
tickets. Although the technique of exchanging lottery tickets has proven to be a 
fruitful and valid way of studying game behavior in exchange relations (Read, 
2005), we chose a different approach in Experiment 5.2 to raise confidence in the 
ecological validity of our results. For this purpose, in Experiment 5.2, participants 
engaged in a trust game in which they received and distributed actual money in 
envelopes. 
 
5.3 EXPERIMENT 5.2 
 
5.3.1 Method 
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Participants. 93 students from a Dutch university volunteered to 
participate in a 'decision-making assignment' in return for money. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of our 2 (Interaction partner: 
individual vs. group) x 2 (Restoration type: compensation vs. compensation and 
apology) between subjects design.  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to experiment 5.1. Upon arrival 
at the laboratory, participants were welcomed and placed in separate cubicles and 
all participants were given some answer sheets and an envelop containing 10 coins 
of 0,20 € (2 Euros). Participants were not able to see or hear each other during the 
entire experiment. 
Next, participants engaged in a trust game with financial outcomes at 
stake. Participants not only received and distributed actual money in envelopes 
and they were paid according to their decisions in the game. As in Experiment 5.1, 
all participants were assigned to the role of trustor and interacted with confederate 
trustees. Depending on the condition they were in, participants were told they had 
to interact with either one participant or a group of two participants. Participants 
were also informed that all instructions were given via the computer, whereas the 
actual interaction (money transfers) would take place with the experimenter 
functioning as a go-between between the interacting parties.  
Trust game and trust violation. As in Experiment 5.1, instructions 
informed the participants that they would play multiple rounds of an interaction 
task. They were told that for this interaction task they would need the envelope 
containing the 10 coins. Than the rules of the trust game were explained more in 
detail, as described for Experiment 5.1.  
To create an incentive for participants to trust in the first round, 
participants were informed that in the first round, he or she could only decide 
between two options. They could either decide to give all 10 coins to the other 
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party (trust) or they could choose to give none to the other(s). If they chose the 
latter option, they could only keep half of their original endowment (5 instead of 
10 coins, 1€ instead of 2€). After participants indicated that they had made their 
decision, the experimenter came by to collect the answer sheets and envelope. 
When a participant decided not to invest, the experiment directly ended and he/she 
was debriefed and given 1€ for their participation. In the current sample, 7 
participants indicated that they chose not to give any money to the other party and 
were hence removed from the sample. For participants who chose to invest (n = 
86), the experimenter ostensibly tripled the amount of coins and told the 
participants to wait for some time, while the other participant made his/her 
decision. After a few minutes, the experimenter re-entered the participant’s cubicle 
and handed out a form filled out by hand, indicating that for that round, the other 
party had decided to return nothing to the participant. 
 Restoration Manipulation. As in Experiment 5.1, in the next phase of the 
experiment, the experimenter entered the room with another envelope and 
explained to the participants that “Since this was the first round of the game, the 
other party had been given the opportunity to reconsider his/her/their allocation 
and was given the option to give them extra coins”. In the compensation and 
apology condition, participants first received a note containing a hand-written 
apology. This apology now contained the principal components that are common 
ground in the apology literature (Schlenker & Darby, 1981; Goffman, 1971; Scher 
& Darley, 1997): (1) a statement of apologetic intent with an acceptance of 
responsibility “I’m sorry I didn’t give you any money” or “We’re sorry we didn’t 
give you any money”; (2) an expressions of remorse to show that the other party 
acknowledges the transgression and feels bad about it, “That was not nice of 
me/us”; (3) a promise of more trustworthy behavior in the future, “I/We promise it 
will not happen again.”.  
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Only after the experimenter made sure that the participants had read the 
apology, he handed out an envelope containing 15 coins (3 Euro). In the 
compensation only condition, participants only received the envelope containing 
15 coins (3 Euro).  
Trust behavior. Our primary dependent variable was trust behavior in the 
second round of the trust game. After the provision of the compensation (with or 
without apology), participants were again endowed with 10 coins of  0,20 € and 
played a second round of the trust game. As in Experiment 5.1, participants could 
choose to send any amount of coins between 0 and 10, providing us with a 
continuous measure of their willingness to trust again. Participants were also 
informed that any coins they decided not to transfer would be theirs to keep. 
Self-reported trust.  Apart from measuring trusting behavior, self-
reported trust was also assessed using two items, based on Desmet et al. (2011). 
Participants therefore answered the following questions on 7-point Likert scales: 
(1) to what degree do you think the other/others will be trustworthy in future 
rounds? (2) to what degree do you think the other/others will take your interest 
into account in future rounds? Scores on these items correlated sufficiently  (r = 
.70, p < .001) and were combined into a general measure of self-reported trust.  
 
5.3.2 Results 
  
Self-reported trust. A 2 (Interaction Partner: individual vs. group) x 2 
(Restoration Type) between subjects ANOVA on the 3-item trust scale, revealed a 
significant main effect of Interaction partner, F(1,82) = 4.30, p < .05, η2 = .05, and 
a main effect for restoration type, F(1,82) = 4.53, p < .05, η2 = .05. Individuals (M 
= 4.75, SD = 0.17) were trusted more than groups (M = 4.26, SD = 0.17) and 
compensations and apologies (M = 4.76, SD = 0.17) fostered more trust than 
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compensations alone (M = 4.26, SD = 0.16). These main effects were however 
qualified by our predicted interaction effect, F(1,82) = 4.53, p < .05, η2 = .05. 
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons 
revealed that whereas for victims interacting with a group receiving an apology in 
addition to compensation resulted in more trust (M = 4.76, SD = 0.25) than 
receiving a compensation alone (M = 3.76, SD = 0.22; F(1,82) = 9.20, p < .01, η2 = 
.10), victims interacting with an individual did not report more trust when 
receiving an apology and a compensation (M = 4.75, SD = 0.24) compared to 
when they only received a compensation (M = 4.75, SD = 0.23; F(1,82) < 1, ns) 
 Trust behavior. A 2 (Interaction Partner: individual vs. group) x 2 
(Restoration Type: compensation vs. compensation and apology) between subjects 
ANOVA on the amount money participants were willing to invest in the second 
round of the trust game, again revealed the predicted interaction effect, F(1,82) = 
5.08, p < .05, η2 = .06. The mean allocations can be found in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2: Mean allocation in round 2 as a function of Restoration Type and Interaction 
Partner for Experiment 5.2. 
 
 
 
Compensation Compensation and Apology 
Individual 6.86 (0.68) a 6.35 (0.72) a 
Group 5.44 (0.64) a 8.05 (0.73) b 
Note: Higher ratings indicate higher levels of trust restoration. Standard deviations are within parentheses. Means 
with different subscripts per row differ significantly from each other after pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni 
adjusted). 
 
Closer examination of this effect (pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
adjustment) revealed that for victims who interacted with a group, receiving an 
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apology in addition to a compensation did result in higher levels of trust, F(1,82) = 
7.21, p < .01, η2 = .08, whereas for victims who were interacting with an 
individual, the provision of an apology did not have an additional effect on trust 
compared to the sole provision of a compensation, F(1,82) < 1, ns. The pattern is 
illustrated in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2. Mean Allocation in second Round of Trust Game as a Function of Restoration Type 
and Interaction Partner for Experiment 5.2. 
 
 
 Mediation analyses. As described above, the Interaction Partner x 
Restoration Type interaction significantly affected self-reported trust as well as 
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subsequent investments. To test whether self-reported trust mediated the 
Interaction Partner x Restoration Type interaction on investments, we conducted 
an additional ANOVA (see Baron & Kenny, 1986) including all previously 
described independent variables (and their interactions) with investments in the 
second round as dependent variable. Self-reported trust (centered) was added as an 
additional predictor in the final (fourth) step. This analysis showed that self-
reported trust indeed significantly affected investments F(1,79) = 4.81, p < .05, η2 
= .06). Moreover, entering trust perceptions rendered the interactive effect of 
trustee identity and organization restoration type on investments non-significant 
F(1,79) = 1.44, p = .23, η2 = .02).  
As a formal test of mediation, a number of researchers (e.g., MacKinnon 
et al., 2002) have recommended to directly test the significance of the mediated 
effect. Therefore, we proceeded by using a bootstrap method, developed by 
Preacher and colleagues (2007), which allows for a formal test of mediated 
moderation (see Muller et al., 2005). Specifically, we estimated whether self-
reported trust mediated the Interaction Partner x Restoration Type interaction on 
investments. In accordance with our predictions, Interaction Partner was treated as 
a moderator of the path from Restoration Type (the independent variable) to self-
reported trust (the mediator), and not as a moderator of the path from self-reported 
trust to investments (the dependent variable). Our effect estimates are based on 
20000 bootstrap samples. 
This analysis clearly supported our hypothesis: the indirect effect of 
restoration type on investments, via trust perceptions, was marginally significantly 
larger than 0 when people played with a group (z = 1.73, one-sided p = .042), but 
not when the trustee was an individual  (z = -.10, two-sided p = .92). 
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5.3.3 Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 5.2 replicated the findings of Experiment 5.1, 
but now using a more elaborate apology that also contained a promise of future 
trustworthy behavior. Again, we found that the provision of an apology in addition 
to a financial compensation can indeed restore trust more than a compensation 
alone, but only so when victims were interacting with a group rather than with an 
individual. Furthermore, the fact that victims’ trust behavior in Experiment 5.2 
was fully mediated by self reported trust towards their interaction partner further 
consolidate the findings of Experiment 5.1. Below we discuss the most important 
implications. 
 
5.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Taken together, the present findings supported our hypothesis that 
following distributive harm, receiving an apology in addition to a financial 
compensation can have a more positive effect on trust compared to when only a 
compensation is provided, but particularly so when people are interacting with a 
group rather than with an individual. Across 2 studies and by using both self-
reported and behavioral measures of trust, we found that when people were 
interacting with a group who violated their trust, receiving an apology and a 
compensation from this group fostered more trust than receiving a compensation 
alone. However, this addition of an apology did not result in more trust when 
people were interacting with an individual. The present findings contribute to the 
literature in several ways. Below we discuss the most important contributions.  
A first contribution is that we examined the effectiveness of apologies 
when offered in addition to compensation. Previous research in trust repair has 
mainly looked at the effectiveness of apologies alone (Kim et al., 2004, 2006; 
Trust Repair and the Psychology of Financial Compensations 
 
 112 
Tomlinson et al., 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006; De Cremer & Desmet, in press). 
However, in exchange relations, where monetary resources have to be divided and 
trust violations most often result in a financial loss for one party, scholars have 
argued that apologies alone might not be sufficient as the outcome related 
concerns also need to be addressed by means of a compensation. Whereas research 
indeed showed that apologies are more effective in exchange relations when they 
are accompanied by a substantial financial compensation (Bottom et al., 2002), 
other studies found that trust also increases when compensation alone is provided 
(Desmet et al., 2011a). However, to date, no research examined whether providing 
an apology has an additional positive influence on trust when financial 
compensations are provided as well. Our findings show that the addition of an 
apology can indeed foster more trust than when a compensation alone is provided, 
but particularly so when victims are interacting with a group, rather than with an 
individual.  
 A second contribution is that we studied how victims react differently to 
reparations depending on whether they are interacting with an individual or a 
group. Most trust research has so far focused on how trust develops between 
individuals. Throughout our daily lives, however, we not only enter in exchange 
relations with other individuals, but also with groups. Unfortunately, to date, little 
is known about whether and how this difference in the entity we interact with 
affects our behavior towards this entity. Moreover, the scarce research that did 
look into this matter only seemed to be interested in how individuals interacting 
with individuals differ from groups interacting with groups and not from 
individuals interacting with groups (e.g. the discontinuity effect, see Schopler et 
al., 1991; Schopler & Insko, 1992). Given our observation that individuals who are 
interacting with a group become more sensitive to whether or not a compensation 
is accompanied by an apology, we demonstrated that one should be careful to 
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generalize behavior of individuals interacting with other individuals to situations 
in which individuals interact with groups.  
 
5.4.1 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
Although we expected the addition of an apology to be more effective 
when victims were interacting with a group rather than with an individual, an 
interesting observation was that receiving an apology in addition to compensation 
did not reveal any added effect when victims were interacting with an individual. 
Whereas this finding would suggest that individuals in an economic exchange with 
other individuals primarily care about the outcomes they receive and that therefore 
addressing relational concerns as well following distributive harm is irrelevant, we 
need to be cautious before making that conclusion too hastily: an important 
limitation is that we studied trust violations and restorations at an early stage in 
economic exchange relations.  
Trust theorists agree that trust can change as relationships develop: 
whereas initially, actors in exchange relations particularly decide to trust based on 
the expectancy of receiving a specific, tangible benefit (i.e., calculus-based trust), 
repeated interaction can cause trust to evolve into a more relational trust, based on 
an identification with the other’s motives and values (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; 
Rousseau et al, 1998). Such identification-based trust is less likely to be only 
driven by concerns for immediate, tangible outcomes alone, as actors now also 
have concerns for the relationship itself. As a result, solely addressing distributive 
justice concerns following a trust violation may not be enough to restore 
identification-based trust, as more relation-oriented efforts (such as sincere and 
elaborate apologies) need to be undertaken as well. As we studied early exchange 
interactions between strangers, trust is more likely to be calculus-based than 
identification-based, which in turn may have inflated the value that victims 
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attached to a financial compensation and, likewise, may have decreased the 
additional effectiveness of apologies. Therefore, we need to be cautious before 
making the claim that apologies have no additional value for trust repair in 
exchange relations between individuals.  
Finally, another limitation lies in the fact that the violation in our studies 
consisted of a single untrustworthy action that was quickly responded to by a 
restorative act. This particular set-up might have rendered participants interacting 
with an individual unsure about whether the violation was intentional or not, 
which in turn could have influenced why apologies did not reveal an additional 
positive effect in that condition. From previous research we know that the degree 
to which victims view a transgression as intentional can have an important impact 
on how restoration efforts are evaluated (Desmet et al., 2011a) and studies have 
shown that because apologies convey an admission of guilt, they are actually less 
effective when guilt has not yet been established (Kim et al., 2004). Although 
participants in the individual condition might have appreciated the compensation, 
the accompanying apology could have lost its additional value as it confirmed to 
the victims that the violation was intentional.  
On the other hand, when participants are interacting with a group who has 
to make a joint decision, the possibility that a violation is unintentional may seem 
less likely. Research has shown that when harm is seen as intentional, providing an 
apology does become effective (Kim et al., 2004). Moreover, in the justice 
literature too it has been suggested that whereas financial compensations are an 
effective response in the case of unintentional distributive harm, following 
intentional harm, compensations alone do not suffice as other, relational concerns 
also need to be addressed, (e.g., by apologies, Darley & Pittman, 2001). This path 
of reasoning above could be an alternative explanation of our results. In that sense, 
one of the biggest limitations of our studies concerns the lack of process data that 
shows how different relational contexts (i.e. whether the interaction partner is a 
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group or an individual) activate outcome and relational concerns to a different 
extent. An interesting avenue for future research would therefore be to disentangle 
the process behind our observed effects and rule out other possible explanations. 
 
5.4.2 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, our findings on the value of receiving an apology in 
addition to a financial compensation illustrate that even in relations in which the 
exchange of tangible outcomes lies at the core, trust repair is not only driven by 
instrumental, outcome-related concerns (i.e. the degree to which victims see their 
loss compensated). We showed that following distributive harm, addressing 
relational concerns too (by adding an apology to a compensation) can result in 
even more trust towards a transgressing interaction partner, although particularly 
so when the transgressing counterpart is a group rather than an individual As such, 
our findings also stress the importance of considering characteristics of 
transgressors when evaluating restorative remedies, as trust repair is apparently not 
only determined by what the transgressor does, but also by who the transgressor is.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
  
This dissertation started out with the question how trust can be repaired in 
economic exchange relations. Given that trust violations in these relations often 
inflict distributive harm to one party, I set out to investigate to what degree 
providing a financial compensation in response to this distributive harm can 
actually increase trust again and what factors influence the effectiveness of this 
compensation. In four chapters I have attempted to provide some empirical 
answers to those questions. In the present chapter, I will provide an overview of 
the findings of chapters 2-5 and discuss the most important implications and 
contributions of these findings. Finally, I will also exlore some interesting avenues 
for future research. 
 
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Chapter 2 
 
The aim of Chapter 2 was to provide answers to some basic first questions 
regarding the effectiveness of financial compensations: can financial 
compensations increase trust again and is the size of the compensation relevant to 
this process? Is it enough for a transgressor to pay for the exact distributive harm 
that was caused or does the act of restoring trust requires more effort and might 
overcompensation foster more trust?  
We argued that in economic exchange relations, in which interactions 
exist in the distribution of economic resources, agents decide to trust eachother 
based on the expectancy of receiving a specific, tangible benefit (i.e., calculus-
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based trust, Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; 1996; Lewicki et al., 2005) and that 
therefore receiving a financial compensation in response to distributive harm can 
indeed increase a victim’s trust towards the transgressor again. Furthermore, given 
the importance of outcomes in shaping trust in exchange relations we reasoned 
that larger (over)compensations have the capacity to restore trust even further, but 
particularly so when victims are not sure whether the violation was intentional or 
not.  Indeed, because information regarding one’s intentions is a crucial element in 
trust (Rousseau et al., 1995; Boon & Holmes, 1991; Mayer et al., 1995; Deutsch, 
1960; Mellinger, 1956), we hypothesized that when a transgression is deemed 
intentional, victims will be less inclined to use the favorability of the 
compensation (i.e. compensation size) to derive the intentions and trustworthiness 
of a transgressor. In that case, we would not expect an overcompensation to foster 
more trust than an exact compensation. 
We tested these hypotheses across the four studies described in Chapter 2. 
Using repeated measures of victims’ self-reported trust, Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
first of all confirmed that in the event of distributive harm, victims’ trust towards 
the transgressor increases again when a transgressor provides a (substantial) 
financial compensation. Furthermore, Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 also confirmed our 
interaction hypothesis that trust can increase more by a slight overcompensation of 
the inflicted harm as compared to an exact or a partial compensation, but not if 
there was clear evidence that the violation was intentional: Whereas both 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 showed that compensation size had no effect when this 
(bad) intent became clear through the use of deception on behalf of the 
transgressor, Experiment 2.2 showed that compensation size also had no effect 
when the transgressor’s intent became clear through a non deceptive statement 
indicating that the transgression was intentional. 
Whereas Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 confirmed our interaction hypothesis 
using self-reported measures of trust, Experiment 2.3 was designed to examine the 
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behavioral repercussions of this interaction hypothesis. For that purpose, 
participants in Experiment 2.3 engaged in a similar game as in Experiment 2.2, but 
now instead of measuring self-reported trust after a compensation was provided, 
victims were given the choice to either continue or exit the relation with the 
transgressor. Again, we observed the same pattern of findings as in Experiment 2.1 
and 2.2. Furthermore, by establishing the meditational process (intent attribution), 
Experiment 2.3 also provided more direct evidence that it is not the use of 
deception per se, but rather the attribution of intent that moderates the effect of 
compensation size.  
Finally, in the last experiment of Chapter 2, Experiment 2.4, we tested 
whether the previously observed interaction effect continues to exist when the 
overcompensation is significantly larger. Also, Experiment 2.4 used a different 
paradigm in which trust was operationalized as investment decisions in a trust 
game. Again, we observed that whether a financial overcompensation fosters more 
trust than an exact compensation, depends on whether the violation was clearly 
intentional or not. Overcompensation can indeed create more trust than an exact 
compensation of the harm when there is still ambiguity about the others intent, but 
when there is clear evidence that the violation was intentional, overcompensations 
will not foster more trust. The findings of Chapter 2 therefore underline the 
importance of attributions of intent in shaping trust in exchange relations. When 
no other information is available regarding the transgressors intentions, victims 
indeed use the favorability of the compensation they receive to derive a 
transgressor’s good intentions and trustworthiness. However, when prior 
information confirms that a violation is due to bad intent on behalf of the 
transgressor, this attribution of bad intent cancels out the effect of compensation 
size and overcompensation will not result in more trust than an exact 
compensation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 In Chapter 2 we showed that the size of a financial compensation can 
sometimes matter for victims, in the sense that when a transgressor decides to 
provide an overcompensation of the harm, this can make the transgressor seem 
more trustworthy than when he or she provides an exact compensation (although 
the prior attribution of bad intent in the violation may hamper this effect). In 
Chapter 3, we decided to move a step further by investigating whether this effect 
of compensation size also depends on whether the compensation is provided 
voluntarily or not. 
Whereas in Chapter 2 the decision to provide a compensation was 
introduced to victims as a voluntary choice made by the transgressor, in real-life 
conflict handling we can see that a common approach in exchange relations is to 
let a third party decide whether and what compensation is appropriate (cf. tort 
litigation). Whether a transgressor voluntarily provides a compensation or is being 
ordered to do so by a third party may however have a considerable impact on the 
degree to which a compensation and its size communicate good intentions and 
trustworthiness on behalf of the transgressor (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; 
Greenberg & Frisch, 1972; McCabe et al., 2003). Indeed, although actors in 
exchange relations have strong concerns for the outcome of specific transactions 
(cf. calculus-based trust), according to many views on trust, a necessary condition 
for an action to communicate trustworthiness is that this behaviour also reflects the 
person’s intentions (Rousseau et al., 1998; Boon & Holmes, 1991; Mayer et al., 
1995; Deutsch, 1960; Mellinger, 1956). Therefore, in contrast to outcome-based 
models in game theory, which would predict that actors would mainly care about 
the outcomes they receive (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), we 
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hypothesized that victims’ trust would only be sensitive to the size of a financial 
compensation when the compensation is provided voluntarily. 
We tested this hypothesis in Experiment 3.1. In this experiment, 
participants played a trust game in which they encountered an interaction partner 
who violated their trust and subsequently provided a financial compensation, 
either voluntarily, or following an intervention by a third person. The results of 
Experiment 3.1 confirmed our hypothesis by showing that when deciding to trust 
again in a subsequent round of the trust game, only victims who received a 
voluntary compensation from the transgressor were sensitive to the size of this 
compensation, in the sense that larger compensations fostered more trust. When 
the compensation by the transgressor was enforced by a third-party, victims’ 
decision to trust or not trust the transgressor was not affected by the size of the 
compensation they received. 
 The findings of Chapter 3 therefore complement the observations in 
Chapter 2, by also demonstrating that the process of trust repair in exchange 
relations is not simply determined by the favorability of the compensation that 
victims receive from the transgressor. Instead, the results of Chapter 3 again 
highlight the pivotal role of perceptions of intent in the process of shaping trust. 
Whereas Chapter 2 revealed that the prior attribution of bad intent in the violation 
impedes the effect of compensation size, Chapter 3 showed that it is not the size 
per se that drives the effect of compensation size on trust, but rather what the 
compensation (and its size) communicates about the transgressor’s intentions. 
 
Chapter 4 
Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 examined how situational characteristics of the 
violation (clarity of intent) or the compensation (size, voluntariness) affected 
victims’ trust, in Chapter 4, we decided to take a broader, interactionist approach 
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and also investigated how personality characteristics of the victim influence the 
process of trust repair. For this purpose, we deemed it would be an interesting first 
step to investigate how individual differences in people’s tendency to forgive 
impact how financial compensations are perceived, processed and reacted upon by 
victims. 
As forgiveness is typically viewed as an unconditional response that is 
given to another, without much regard for the offender’s current intentions and 
actions (Fincham 2000; Enright et al., 1998), we hypothesized that people with a 
higher tendency to forgive (Brown 2003; Brown & Philips, 2005) would be less 
sensitive to whether or not a restoration attempt expresses repentance on behalf of 
the transgressor. Given that voluntary compensations are more likely to 
communicate offender’s repentance than compensations that were enforced by a 
third party, Experiment 4.1 used a similar trust game paradigm as in Experiment 
3.1, but now investigated how victims respond differently to compensations that 
are voluntary or forced, depending on whether they are generally more forgiving 
or not. In this experiment, we tested the mediational hypothesis that whereas 
receiving a voluntary compensation from the transgressor would communicate 
more repentance to victims than when this compensation was imposed, 
particularly people with a low tendency to forgive will be inclined to discount this 
repentance in their decision to trust again. For that purpose, Experiment 4.1 not 
only included behavioural and self-reported measures of trust, but also a measure 
of perceived repentance. 
The results of Experiment 4.1 confirmed the mediational hypothesis and 
showed that whereas all victims perceived a transgressor as more repentant when 
he/she voluntarily provided a compensation (compared to when this compensation 
was imposed), people with a low tendency to forgive were more inclined to weigh 
this repentance in their decision to trust again than people with a high tendency to 
forgive. The findings of Chapter 4 therefore stress the value of taking a broader, 
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interactionist approach when studying trust repair, as personality characteristics of 
the victim also influence how situation-specific aspects of a restorative act are 
perceived, processed and reacted upon (i.e. the voluntariness of a compensation 
and the repentance it communicates).  
 
Chapter 5 
Whereas Chapter 2-4 studied how financial compensations alone affect 
victims’ trust, in Chapter 5, we tried to answer the question whether providing a 
financial compensation is a sufficient strategy in response to distributive harm and 
whether offering an apology in addition to a compensation can can create more 
trust than a compensation alone. So far, we argued that as trust in economic 
exchange relations is particularly driven by calculus-based trust and strong 
concern for the outcomes of a transaction, providing a financial compensation in 
response to distributive harm can be an effective strategy to restore trust. 
However, researchers have argued that apart from having strong outcome-related 
concerns, actors in economic exchange relations can also have concern for the 
relation itself (Curhan et al., 2006; De Cremer, 2002).  As a violation of trust may 
then not only affect victims concern for outcomes, but also relational concerns, an 
interesting question is whether addressing both outcome-related and relational 
concerns following distributive harm is more effective than addressing outcome 
concerns alone.  
As financial compensations particularly address outcome related concerns 
and apologies more explicitly speak to relational concerns, we argued that the 
addition of an apology will be more effective in situations in which relational 
concerns are more salient. Therefore we hypothesized that adding an apology to a 
compensation can indeed result in more trust, but particularly so when victims are 
interacting with a group rather than with an individual. In Experiment 5.1 and 5.2, 
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we tested this hypothesis within the context of trust game. By observing the 
hypothesized effect on self-reported and behavioural measures of trust, we found 
that addressing both instrumental and relational concerns, by providing a financial 
compensation and an apology, can have an additional positive impact on a 
victim’s subsequent trust, but this effect however only emerged when people were 
interacting with a group, rather than with an individual. 
Together with the other chapters, the findings of Chapter 5 therefore again 
illustrate how the efficiency of financial compensations in the process of trust 
repair in exchange relations is not simply determined by the material, financial 
value of the compensation itself. Whereas Chapters 2, 3 and 4 already 
demonstrated the importance of information about intentions in the violation and 
the compensation (intent attribution and voluntariness), the results of Chapter 5 
again show how victims of distributive harm can also value aspects of the 
compensation that are less tangible, such as the addition of an apology.  However, 
given that this latter effect depends on whether the victim interacts with a group or 
an individual, Chapter 5 also identifies another important factor in the process of 
trust repair, namely characteristics of the entity that a victim is interacting with.  
The findings of this dissertation therefore also illustrate how the process of trust 
repair in economic exchange relations is not only shaped by characteristics of the 
reparation (size, voluntariness, whether or not an apology is provided as well) but 
also by aspects of the violation (clarity of intentionality) and fundamental 
characteristics of the victim (dispositional tendency to forgive) and the 
transgressing party (group or individual).  
 
6.2 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Throughout the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I highlighted the 
major implications and contributions of the findings of each chapter individually. 
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In addition, I now turn to discussing some general implications and contributions 
of my work.  
The major contribution of my work is that I investigated the effectiveness 
of a repair tactic that is commonly used, yet did not receive much empirical 
attention so far. If we look at the the literature on trust repair in particular or on 
restoration processes in general, we can indeed see that scholars have mainly 
looked at the effectiveness of verbal repair strategies, such as statements of denial, 
the formulation of excuses or the provision of apologies and/or promises (Kim et 
al., 2004, 2006; Tomlinson et al., 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006; Struthers et al., 
2008). Whereas verbal repair strategies may indeed be effective in cases where a 
violation entails no material damage, in economic exchange relations, where 
interactions exist in the exchange of tangible resources and transgressions most 
often result in distributive harm for a victim, explanations, apologies or promises 
may not be enough to restore trust, as the tangible loss of resources also needs to 
be addressed (Bottom et al., 2002). Interestingly, if we look at how real-life 
conflicts in economic exchange relations are often dealt with, we can see that a 
common restorative tactic used in such situations indeed consists of a transgressor 
paying a sum of money to compensate a victim for his loss (see e.g. tort litigation).  
Strangely enough, the high prevalence of financial compensations as a 
restorative response contrasts sharply with what is actually known about their 
effectiveness and the factors shaping this effectiveness. Based on the argument 
that actors who enter exchange relations have strong concerns for the outcomes 
they receive and given that the outcomes of transactions are therefore important in 
shaping trust in these relations (Lewicki et al., 2005; Rousseau et al., 1998), we 
hypothesized and found that financial compensations can indeed increase trust 
again and that the size of this compensation can influence its effectiveness. 
However, at the same time our findings also demonstrated that it is not only the 
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favorability of the outcome (the financial value of the compensation) that drives 
the process of trust repair, as immaterial aspects of the violation (intent 
attribution), the compensation (voluntariness, whether or not an apology is added) 
and fundamental characteristics of the victim (dispositional tendency to forgive) or 
the transgressor (whether or not the transgressor is a group or an individual) all 
play an important role in the restoration process. As such, I believe to have 
provided some valuable first steps in our understanding of the true value of 
financial compensations in economic exchange relations. 
  A second contribution of my research is that I investigated financial 
compensations in terms of the trust they foster. Whereas for a long time the 
literature on economic exchange relations was dominated by a view in which trust 
was considered as unnecessary or irrelevant to preserve cooperation, researchers 
now agree that trust is both beneficial and necessary in exchange relations, as it is 
an inexpensive and effective way to create long-term cooperation (Kramer, 1999; 
Lorenz, 1999; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Bromiley & 
Cummings, 1996). Indeed, whereas scholars initially were convinced that the 
uncertainty and risk associated with the outcome dependencies in exchange 
relations could also be reduced by other mechanisms such as contracts and control 
mechanisms that reward cooperation and sanction defection (Williamson, 1993), 
research has proven that such instruments are actually only a weak substitute for 
trust, not only because contracts and control mechanisms are seldomly flawless 
(Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Sako & Helper, 1998), but also because they undermine 
cooperation that is voluntary and therefore pose a threat on long-term cooperation  
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  
Given this importance of trust in exchange relations, I deemed that it is not 
only important to examine how trust can be created or strengthened in these 
relations, but also that it is imperative to investigate how it can be rebuilt 
following transgressions and breaches of cooperation. In the present dissertation, I 
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therefore focused on trust as a main dependent variable and evaluated restoration 
processes on different measures of trust. Not only did I assess trust as a snapshot-
level of self-reported trusting intentions and trustworthiness perceptions (Chapter 
4, 5), I also studied the effectiveness of compensations by looking at the increase 
in self-reported trust they foster (Chapter 2). Furthermore, I also weighed the 
effectiveness of financial compensations by observing their repercussions on 
behavior that is typically driven by trust, such as exit behavior or investment 
decisions in a trust game (Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5).  
Finally, another contribution is that I studied trust repair by looking at the 
influence of different elements in the restoration process. Throughout the research 
presented in this dissertation, I did not limit my scope to investigating how 
characteristics of the compensation itself influence the effectiveness of financial 
compensations (size, voluntariness, whether or not an apology is included) but also 
studied how characteristics of the violation, the violator and the victim impact the 
restoration process. In chapter 2, I demonstrated how characteristics of the 
violation (clarity of intentions) determine how a compensation and its size is 
processed. In Chapter 4, I observed how personality characteristics of the victim 
confine to what degree a victim values a compensation that communicates 
repentance. Finally, Chapter 5 showed that not only the personality of the victim, 
but also fundamental characteristics of the transgressor play a significant role in 
the process of trust repair: whether people are interacting with a group or an 
individual determines to what extent a victim values relational reparation 
(apologies) in addition to a compensation.  
As such, an important implication of my findings for decision makers in 
exchange relations is that it is important to consider that trust repair is a multi-
faceted process that is influenced by different elements in the relation. Even in 
economic exchange relations, where the only interaction consists of resource 
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exchanges and violations have a clear, quantifiable distributive harm, trust repair is 
not simply determined by the financial value of a compensation. Contrary to 
popular belief in tort law, immaterial aspects such as intent in the violation, 
whether a compensation is imposed or voluntarily provided and whether or not an 
apology accompanies a compensation, all contribute to the actual value that 
victims attach to a compensation, as witnessed in their decision to trust again. And 
even more so, the process of trust repair also appears to depend on factors in the 
relation that actors do not have much control over, as our findings showed that 
victims can be guided by their dispositional tendency to forgive and even 
influenced by the simple fact whether their interaction partner is a group or an 
individual.  
 
6.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Whereas the goal of this dissertation was to provide much needed answers 
regarding the process of trust repair and the effectiveness of financial 
compensations in economic exchange relations, the findings reported in this 
dissertation also raise some interesting questions that definitely seem worthy of 
future research.  
In the studies described in this dissertation I investigated trust violations 
and trust repair in exchange relations that had no prior interaction history. 
Participants entered in an economic exchange with a total stranger and violations 
happened early in the relation. An intriguing question then is how the trust repair 
process would look like in economic exchange relations that have a longer 
interaction history.  
Trust theorists agree that trust changes as relationships develop: whereas 
initially, actors in exchange relations particularly decide to trust based on the 
expectancy of receiving a specific, tangible benefit (i.e., calculus-based trust), 
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repeated interaction can cause trust to evolve into a more relational trust, based on 
an identification with the other’s motives and values (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 
1996; Rousseau et al, 1998). As this evolved, identification-based trust places the 
relationship itself more central, trust at this level is less likely to be only driven by 
concerns for immediate, tangible outcomes alone. As a result, a violation in such 
relations may also cause relational damage that needs to be addressed. As such, 
one could wonder whether strategies that particularly address outcome-related 
concerns, such as financial compensations would exert similar effects in exchange 
relations that have developed this identity-based trust. Would financial 
compensations still increase trust then? Would the same factors influence their 
effectiveness? 
Although at first glance one could think that a more relational focus would 
imply that financial compensations become less important to victims, this need not 
necessarily be the case. If the relation remains an economic exchange relation, in 
which interactions exist of resource exchanges (i.e. the language remains 
economic resources), it would still seem necessary to address a victim’s 
distributive harm by means of a compensation. Even more so, it might as well also 
be the case that compensation size would still be important and overcompensation 
could for example foster more trust. However, the reason underlying their 
effectiveness may take a more relational shift, in the sense that victims read and 
attach more relational value to the compensation and its size. 
On the other hand, when the form of the relationship has changed as well, 
and it is no longer economic resources alone that are exchanged, the sole provision 
of a financial compensation may not be enough for victims and might even trigger 
taboo trade-off reactions like “I don’t believe you’re trying to buy me off here” 
(Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). In that case it might be more effective for a transgressor 
to also undertake actions that more explicitly address a victim’s thwarted relational 
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concerns. Extensive explanations and/or apologies that explicitly aim to repair the 
relationship itself may then become more effective. 
Regardless of whether compensations (and their size) become more or less 
important, it is important to note that some of the processses that I found to be 
influencing the effectiveness of financial compensations may continue to exert a 
similar if not stronger influence in exchange relations that have a longer 
interaction history.  For example, in Chapter 5, we observed that the addition of an 
apology to a compensation can sometimes foster more trust. As I already described 
that apologies can more explicitly address relational concerns, the effectiveness of 
adding elaborate apologies to a financial compensation is likely to increase as 
exchange relations grow and develop more identification-based trust.   
Likewise, in Chapter 2 I argued that an important factor influencing trust 
repair is the attribution of intent in the violation. As the intentionality of a 
violation is a strong indicator of one’s integrity and values, the attribution of intent 
is also likely to play a key role in the repair of identification-based trust, where the 
alignment of values and an internalization of eachother’s intentions and needs 
stands central (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). Even more so, scholars have 
argued that violations of identification-based trust “cause the victim to primarily 
focus on the intent of the other’s actions” (Lewicki et al., 2005, p.263). 
Furthermore, because violations of identification-based trust are likely to shake up 
the victim’s perceived compatibility of values, scholars have argued that repair 
attempts in these relations need to be even more concentrated on restoring the 
benevolent intentions of the transgressor (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewicki et al., 
2005). As a result, whether a transgressor provides a compensation voluntarily or 
not (Chapters 3, 4), may matter as much, if not even more in economic exchange 
relations that have a richer interaction history.  
Although the reasoning above is, of course, speculative, future 
contributions could find a worthwhile undertaking in empirically investigating 
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how restoration processes look like in exchange relations with a longer interaction 
history. Their findings would, without a doubt, greatly improve our understanding 
of trust and the process of trust repair in economic exchange relations.  
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
Vertrouwen is een kostbaar maar kwetsbaar goed in onze interacties met 
anderen. Of we nu raad vragen aan een vriend of de weg aan een vreemdeling, 
zonder enig vertrouwen in anderen zouden we vaak niet ver komen. Vertrouwen is 
dan ook een belangrijke katalysator van onze interacties: zo zorgt het er niet alleen 
voor dat we überhaupt interacties aangaan met anderen, maar ook dat we ons 
welwillender en meer coöperatief opstellen eenmaal in deze interacties, wat 
vervolgens ook de kans vergroot dat deze anderen ook coöperatief zullen zijn naar 
ons toe .   
Ook in economische relaties, waarin partijen goederen met een 
economische waarde uitwisselen, speelt vertrouwen een belangrijke rol. Kopen we 
bijvoorbeeld een tweedehands auto, dan moeten we de verkoper vaak vertrouwen 
dat er niet mee geknoeid is. Verder kijken we bijvoorbeeld ook niet altijd naar de 
houdbaarheidsdatum van een levensmiddel en lijken we de winkelier dus wel te 
vertrouwen dat we geen vervallen producten kopen. Ondanks het feit dat 
vertrouwen ook in economische relaties zo belangrijk is, leert de werkelijkheid ons 
echter dat vertrouwen in die relaties toch vaak geschonden wordt. Zo kopen 
klanten soms producten die niet aan de beloofde verwachtingen blijken te voldoen 
en worden bedrijven ook wel eens geconfronteerd met klanten die niet of te weinig 
betalen voor geleverde prestaties. Gezien dergelijke inbreuken niet alleen nefast 
kunnen zijn voor het verdere verloop van de relatie zelf, maar ook voor hoe 
andere, toekomstige relaties kunnen verlopen (door negatieve rereclame bvb.), is 
het belangrijk om te weten hoe in dergelijke gevallen vertrouwen terug hersteld 
kan worden en welke acties hierbij doeltreffend kunnen zijn. 
Aangezien inbreuken in economische relaties meestal ook economische 
schade opleveren voor het slachtoffer, zien we dat een vaak gebruikte strategie 
erin bestaat dat de overtreder het slachtoffer vergoedt voor de geleden schade. Een 
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klant met klachten over een bepaald product wordt bijvoorbeeld dikwijls 
terugbetaald en krijgt hier soms nog iets voor bovenop; bedrijven die aangeklaagd 
worden proberen vaak een financiële schikking te treffen met het slachtoffer of 
kunnen door een rechtbank gedwongen worden tot het betalen van een 
schadevergoeding. Maar wat doen dergelijke financiële compensaties met het 
vertrouwen van een slachtoffer? Kunnen schadevergoedingen vertrouwen wel 
terug doen toenemen en zo ja, welke factoren bepalen dan hun doeltreffendheid? 
Dat zijn vragen waarop empirische antwoorden nog niet echt bestaan en dat zijn de 
kernvragen van dit doctoraat. 
In het onderzoek beschreven in dit doctoraat zijn we de effecten van 
schadevergoedingen op vertrouwensherstel experimenteel nagegaan, hierbij 
gebruikmakend van paradigma’s uit de speltheorie (dictator games en trust 
games). In deze experimenten werden proefpersonen geconfronteerd met een 
andere partij die hun vertrouwen beschadigde en hen economische schade 
berokkende, waarna zij een compensatie ontvingen. Gezien er zo weinig geweten 
is over wat compensaties nu met slachtoffers doen, vormen deze paradigma’s een 
goed startpunt om te kijken naar de psychologische processen die compensaties in 
gang zetten en die zo vertrouwensherstel beïnvloeden. Hieronder schets ik de 
belangrijkste bevindingen uit de empirische hoofdstukken. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 
Het doel van het eerste empirische hoofdstuk (Hoofdstuk 2) bestond erin 
antwoorden te zoeken op een aantal basisvragen over schadevergoedingen. 
Kunnen financiële compensaties vertrouwen verhogen na een inbreuk en heeft de 
grootte van een compensatie hier invloed op? Is het genoeg voor een overtreder 
om de geleden schade exact terug te betalen of kunnen overcompensaties 
vertrouwen zelfs meer doen stijgen?  
In Hoofdstuk 2 zijn we dit nagegaan aan de hand van vier experimenten. 
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Hierbij argumenteerden we dat schadevergoedingen inderdaad vertrouwen terug 
kunnen doen stijgen, maar dat de vraag of een overcompensatie tot meer 
vertrouwen kan leiden zal afhangen van de manier waarop het vertrouwen 
geschonden werd. Meerbepaald stelden we dat vooral wanneer het onduidelijk is 
voor slachtoffers of de overtreding intentioneel was of niet, zij zich zullen laten 
leiden door de grootte van de schadevergoeding om te bepalen of de overtreder 
nog te vertrouwen is, in die zin dat een overcompensatie in dat geval vertrouwen 
meer kan doen stijgen dan een exacte compensatie. Echter, wanneer het voor 
slachtoffers duidelijk is dat de overtreding intentioneel gebeurde, zal de grootte 
van de compensatie minder uitmaken voor hen: overcompensatie zal in dat geval 
hun vertrouwen niet meer doen stijgen dan een exacte compensatie. Experiment 
2.1 en 2.2 toonden dit vooropgestelde interactie-effect aan op de mate waarin 
vertrouwen stijgt na een compensatie. In Experiment 2.3 werd aangetoond hoe dit 
effect ook het gedrag van slachtoffers beïnvloedt (i.e. de mate waarin zij liever 
naar een andere interactiepartner op zoek gaan). Gebruikmakend van een ander 
paradigma (trust game), toonde Experiment 2.4 tenslotte aan dat dit effect niet 
alleen geldt voor een kleine overcompensatie, maar ook voor een grotere 
overcompensatie.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3 
 Waar Hoofdstuk 2 aantoonde dat het effect van compensatiegrootte 
afhangt van de manier waarop vertrouwen geschonden werd,  gaat hoofdstuk 3 een 
stapje verder door te onderzoeken of het effect van compensatiegrootte ook 
afhangt van de manier waarop de compensatie verkregen wordt.  De compensaties 
gebruikt in Hoofdstuk 2 werden namelijk op vrijwillige basis verstrekt door de 
overtreder. In de werkelijkheid echter, zien we dat financiële compensaties vaak 
opgelegd worden door een derde partij,  zoals in een rechtbank.  
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Aangezien de beslissing om iemand te vertrouwen een weging is die niet 
louter gebaseerd is op het gedrag van die persoon, maar ook op de intenties die 
men toeschrijft aan dit gedrag, argumenteerden we in Hoofdstuk 3 dat de mate 
waarin grotere schadevergoedingen ook meer vertrouwen opwekken ook kan 
afhangen van de manier waarop de compensatie verkregen wordt. Meerbepaald 
stelden we in Hoofdstuk 3 dat grotere compensaties alleen meer vertrouwen zullen 
opwekken wanneer de compensatie ook als vrijwillig gezien wordt. Wanneer een 
compensatie immers afgedwongen werd door een derde partij, zegt de grootte van 
de compensatie niets over de intenties van de overtreder en communiceren grotere 
compensaties niet noodzakelijk dat de andere het ook beter met het slachtoffer 
voor heeft. Gebruik makend van een trust game paradigma, bevestigde Experiment 
3.1 inderdaad deze hypothese: enkel wanneer een overtreder vrijwillig 
compenseerde leidde een overcompensatie tot meer vertrouwen dan een exacte 
compensatie, en een exacte compensatie tot meer vertrouwen dan een gedeeltelijke 
compensatie. Wanneer de compensatie afgedwongen werd, werden slachtoffers 
niet beïnvloed door de grootte van de compensatie in hun vertrouwensgedrag.  
De bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 3 sluiten daarmee ook aan bij de 
observaties in hoofdstuk 2, doordat ze opnieuw aantonen dat het proces van 
vertrouwensherstel in economische relaties niet simpelweg bepaald wordt door de 
grootte van de compensatie. De bevindingen uit Hoofdstuk 3 beklemtonen immers 
no eens de cruciale rol van percepties van intenties in het kweken van vertrouwen. 
Waar Hoofdstuk 2 blootlegde dat een voorafgaande attributie van intentionaliteit 
het effect van compensatiegrootte verhindert, laat Hoofdstuk 3 zien dat het niet de 
grootte van de compensatiegrootte perse is die meer of minder vertrouwen opwekt, 
maar eerder wat deze grootte zegt over de intenties van de overtreder. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 
Terwijl Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 onderzochten hoe vertrouwensherstel beïnvloed 
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wordt door situationele kenmerken van de overtreding (duidelijkheid van 
intentionaliteit), of de compensatie (grootte, vrijwilligheid), neemt Hoofdstuk 4 
een meer interactionistische benadering, door ook te kijken naar hoe 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken van het slachtoffer vertrouwensherstel kunnen 
beïnvloeden. Daarom leek het een interessante eerste stap om te onderzoeken hoe 
individuele verschillen in de algemene neiging tot vergeven een effect hebben op 
hoe financiële compensaties gepercipieerd worden en hoe er op gereageerd wordt.  
Aangezien vergiffenis typisch iets is dat gegeven wordt en niet perse 
verdiend moet worden, argumenteerden we in Hoofdstuk 4 dat mensen met een 
grotere neiging tot vergeven ook minder gevoelig zullen zijn voor de mate waarin 
een herstelpoging berouw uitdrukt. Gegeven dat een vrijwillige compensatie 
waarschijnlijk meer berouw communiceert dan een compensatie die afgedwongen 
werd door een derde, gingen we in Experiment 4.1 na of slachtoffers anders 
reageren op compensaties die vrijwillig of na afdwinging gegeven worden, 
naargelang deze slachtoffers meer of minder de algemene neiging hebben tot 
vergeven. Experiment 4.1 gebruikte daarom een gelijkaardig trust game paradigma 
als in Experiment 3.1 maar testte nu de mediatie-hypothese dat terwijl enerzijds 
slachtoffers allen geneigd zijn om een overtreder die vrijwillig compenseert als 
meer berouwvol te zien dan een overtreder die gedwongen werd tot compensatie, 
anderzijds slachtoffers met een hoge dispositionele neiging tot vergeven deze mate 
van berouw minder meenemen in hun beslissing om de ander te vertrouwen en 
zich opnieuw kwetsbaar op te stellen. De resultaten van Experiment 4.1 
bevestigden deze hypothese en beklemtonen daarmee ook de waarde aan van een 
bredere, interactionistische benadering van het proces van vertrouwensherstel, 
doordat ze illustreren hoe persoonlijkheidskenmerken van het slachtoffer ook een 
effect hebben op hoe situatiespecifieke aspecten van compensaties 
vertrouwensherstel beïnvloeden.  
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Hoofdstuk 5 
Waar in Hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 4 de klemtoon lag op de effectiviteit 
van compensaties alleen, ligt de focus van Hoofdstuk 5 op de vraag of 
compensaties alleen genoeg zijn. In Hoofdstuk 5 werd daarom onderzocht of 
compensaties tot meer vertrouwen leiden als ze ook gepaard gaan met expliciete 
verontschuldigingen van de overtreder.  
Gezien financiële compensaties vooral op de economische schade een 
antwoord bieden, en uitgebreide verontschuldigingen meer expliciet tot relationele 
bezorgdheden spreken, redeneerden we in Hoofdstuk 5 dat de toevoeging van 
verontschuldigingen vooral effectief zal zijn in situaties waarin relationele 
bezorgdheden meer uitgesproken zijn. Daarom vormden we in Hoofdstuk 5 de 
hypothese dat de toevoeging van verontschuldigingen inderdaad tot meer 
vertrouwen kan leiden, maar vooral wanneer slachtoffers met een groep van 
mensen interageren, dan wanneer ze met een individu interageren. De resultaten 
van Experiment 5.1 en 5.2 bevestigden deze hypothese in de context van de trust 
game: enkel wanneer proefpersonen interageerden met een groep leidde de 
toevoeging van verontschuldigingen tot meer vertrouwen dan het geven van een 
schadevergoeding alleen.  
Samen met de andere hoofdstukken illustreren de bevindingen van 
Hoofdstuk 5 dus opnieuw dat de doeltreffendheid van financiële compensaties in 
vertrouwensherstel in economische uitwisselingsrelaties niet simpelweg afhangt 
van de materiële, financiële waarde van de compensatie zelf. Waar Hoofdstuk 2, 3 
en 4 al het belang onderstreepten van informatie over intenties in de inbreuk 
(duidelijkheid van intentionaliteit) en in de compensatie (vrijwilligheid), tonen de 
resultaten van Hoofdstuk 5 opnieuw aan dat slachtoffers van economische schade 
ook andere, niet-materiële aspecten van het herstelproces waarderen, namelijk of 
een compensatie al dan niet gepaard gaat met verontschuldigingen. Echter, omdat 
Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
 
                                                                                                                 
 157 
dit laatste fenomeen afhangt van of het slachtoffer met een groep of met een 
individu interageert, legt Hoofdstuk 5 ook een andere belangrijke factor in het 
proces van vertrouwensherstel bloot, namelijk kenmerken van de entiteit waarmee 
het slachtoffer interageert. De bevindingen van dit doctoraat illustreren daarom 
ook hoe het proces van vertrouwensherstel in economische relaties niet alleen 
gestuurd wordt door karakteristieken van de herstelpoging (compensatiegrootte, 
vrijwilligheid, of er al dan niet verontschuldigingen bij gegeven worden), maar 
ook door eigenschappen van de inbreuk (duidelijkheid van intentionaliteit) en 
fundamentele kenmerken van het slachtoffer (dispositionele neiging tot vergeven) 
en de overtreder (of deze een groep of een individu is).  
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TRUST REPAIR AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCIAL COMPENSATIONS
Trust is a valuable resource that facilitates and smoothes interactions in all kinds of
rela tions that we engage in. Whether we ask a stranger for directions or advice from a
close friend, we would often not get far if we did not trust others. In economic exchange
relations too, where agents exchange resources that have a tangible economic value, trust
has proven to be particularly useful as it fosters cooperation while at the same time
reducing the need for expenditures on control and monitoring. Questions like “What are
the benefits of trust?” and “How can trust be built effectively?” have already found their
answer in the literature. However, on how to deal with lowered trust after it was violated,
answers still tend to be empirically unclear.
Given that transgressions in economic relations often result in distributive harm for the
victim (i.e. loss of economic resources), a common approach in exchange relations consists
of the transgressor providing a financial compensation to the victim: if a customer has
complaints about a product, he is reimbursed; when a company is being sued, it often tries
to make a financial settlement with the victims. Strangely enough, the high prevalence of
financial compensations as a restorative response contrasts sharply with how little is known
about their effectiveness. Can financial compensations actually increase trust again and
what are the factors that determine their effectiveness? 
This dissertation aims to provide some first, much needed empirical answers regarding
the effectiveness of financial compensations in restoring trust. In this venture, I will not
only show how aspects of the compensation itself determine effectiveness (size,
voluntariness, whether or not an apology is provided in addition), but also how specific
characteristics of the violation, the victim and the transgressor impact victims’ reactions to
a compensation.
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